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Abstract 
East Asians endorse naïve dialecticism, a lay belief system that tolerates 
contradictory information (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Accordingly, individuals of East 
Asian (vs. European) cultural backgrounds are more likely to hold and less likely to 
change ambivalent attitudes (Ng et al., 2012). If East Asians have a heightened tendency 
to see both positive and negative aspects of an object or issue, but less inclination to 
resolve these inconsistencies, they may experience more difficulty in committing to an 
action, and thus be more indecisive than other cultural groups. This, in turn, may have a 
negative impact on life satisfaction. These propositions were tested in four studies. In 
Study 1 (N = 59) I examined how indecisive tendency differed between East Asian 
Canadian and European Canadian participants using a real educational decision.  Results 
indicated that East Asian Canadian participants exhibited different manifestations of 
indecisiveness (i.e., decision difficulty, post-decision regret, decision latency) to a higher 
degree than did European Canadian participants. In Study 2 (N = 511) I investigated 
cultural differences in chronic indecisiveness and how naïve dialecticism and need for 
cognition might contribute to these differences by comparing East Asian Canadians, 
South Asian Canadians, and European Canadians. It was found that East Asian (vs. 
European and South Asian) Canadian participants exhibited more chronic 
indecisiveness, and naïve dialecticism and need for cognition mediated the relationship 
between culture and indecisiveness in opposite directions. In Study 3 (N = 104) I tested 
again the mediating role that naïve dialecticism plays in explaining cultural differences 
in chronic indecisiveness and examined how these differences might have negative 
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downstream consequences for life satisfaction. Results indicated that East Asian (vs. 
European) Canadian participants had lower life satisfaction, which was mediated serially 
by naïve dialecticism through chronic indecisiveness. In Study 4 (N = 109) I established 
the causal effect of naïve dialecticism on indecision using a priming method and tested 
whether evaluative ambivalence would explain this effect in a consumer choice task. It 
was found that European Canadian participants who were primed with a dialectical 
mindset were more indecisive when choosing a computer, relative to those not primed, 
and this effect was mediated by evaluative ambivalence toward the chosen alternative. 
Findings of this dissertation contribute to the indecisiveness literature by showing 
individual and cultural variations in indecisiveness as well as their antecedents, 
mechanisms, and consequences. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Knowledge of cultural differences in choice and decision making has important 
implications in areas such as career counseling, medical decision making, political 
psychology, and marketing, as our world is increasingly marked by cultural diversity. 
However, research examining how cultural factors may affect individuals' choice and 
decision making processes and outcomes is still fairly limited. The present dissertation 
research aims to make a contribution to the literature by investigating how 
indecisiveness varies between individuals of different cultural backgrounds as well as its 
underlying mechanism and downstream consequences. 
Indecisiveness 
What should I eat for dinner? Which computer should I buy? Which university 
should I go to? What career should I pursue? Who should I date? Should I get married 
now? We are constantly bombarded with choices and decisions. Although having the 
opportunity to make one’s own decisions and choose what one wants seems desirable, 
decision making can also be demanding or stressful at times. Some people, however, are 
chronically indecisive in that they have a general tendency to experience decision 
difficulty across domains and situations (Germeijs & de Boeck, 2002). According to 
Germeijs and de Boeck (2002), there are several behavioural, cognitive, and affective 
indicators of indecisiveness, including long decision latency, deferring decisions, 
leaving decisions to someone else, not knowing how to decide, perceived difficulty 
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when making a decision, avoiding decisions, worrying about decisions made, and 
regretting decisions made. 
Past research on indecisiveness mostly came from applied areas. In marketing, 
researchers have examined choice deferral in the consumer context. For example, Dhar 
(1997) found that people are more likely to postpone their purchase decisions when 
confronted with options that are similarly attractive, compared to options that vary more 
substantially in their attractiveness (see Tversky & Shafir, 1992, for similar findings). In 
educational psychology, it has been demonstrated in a longitudinal study that general 
indecisiveness assessed in the last year of high school predicted less commitment to the 
chosen major in the first year of postsecondary education (Germeijs & Verschueren, 
2011). In the related area of vocational counseling, practitioners have reported that some 
clients seem to experience considerable difficulty in choosing a career as well as staying 
in a career. Accordingly, there has been some research effort devoted to the assessment 
and treatment of career indecision (e.g., Ferrari, Nota, & Soresi, 2012; Slaney, 1988). 
Another area of research on indecisiveness comes from clinical psychology. For clinical 
researchers, indecisiveness has been examined in terms of the role it plays in 
psychological disorders. For instance, chronic indecisiveness has been found to be 
associated with both depressive symptoms (Rassin, Muris, Franken, Smit, & Wong, 
2007) and obsessive-compulsive tendencies (Gayton, Clavin, Clavin, & Broida, 1994; 
Rassin & Muris, 2005). Curiously, and in contrast to applied areas of research, 
indecisiveness has not received as much attention from basic researchers. 
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Culture and Indecisiveness 
Cross-cultural theories can inform the development of psychological models that 
explain variations at both the individual and the group levels (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, 
& Dasen, 2002). Looking at the phenomenon of indecisiveness through a cultural lens 
can therefore not only document and provide possible explanations of cultural variations 
in indecisive tendency, but also shed light on the basic processes underlying indecisive 
behaviours. A review of the literature revealed only a handful of studies in which 
researchers investigated cultural differences in indecisiveness. In an early study on 
marketing decision making with business executives from mainland China, Hong Kong, 
and Canada using an alternative preference rating task, Tse, Lee, Vertinsky, and 
Wehrung (1988) found that mainland Chinese managers were less indecisive than both 
Hong Kong Chinese managers and Canadian managers, whereas the latter two groups 
did not differ from each other. In another study, the Melbourne Decision Making 
Questionnaire (Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997) was administered to university 
students from Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
States (Mann et al., 1998). Based on this measure, East Asian participants were more 
likely to exhibit decision avoidance behaviours, such as procrastination and buck-
passing, than their Western counterparts. More recently, researchers examined how 
thorough participants from different cultures were when deliberating between two 
alternatives on a general knowledge test (Yates, Ji, Oka, Lee, Shinotsuka, & Sieck, 
2010). It was found that Japanese participants spent more time on each item and 
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generated more arguments for each item compared to Chinese and European American 
participants, indicating more indecisiveness.  
As a whole, the results of these past studies are quite mixed and difficult to 
reconcile into a coherent picture of cultural differences in indecisiveness. Importantly, 
these seemingly discrepant findings are not amenable to direct comparison because each 
study tapped into a specific aspect of indecisiveness and within a specific domain (cf. 
Mann et al., 1998). Hence, it may be more fruitful to turn to studies in which researchers 
examined cultural differences in general indecisiveness using the same comprehensive 
measure of indecisiveness – the Indecisiveness Scale (IS; Frost & Shows, 1993). In a 
study conducted in the United States, Americans of East Asian cultural backgrounds 
scored higher on the IS than did Americans of European cultural backgrounds 
(Wengrovitz & Patalano, 2004, as cited in Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2006). However, 
when these same researchers conducted a cross-national study comparing Chinese 
participants with American ones, they did not find any cultural differences (Patalano & 
Wengrovitz, 2006). Also using the IS, Yates and colleagues (2010) found that Japanese 
participants were more indecisive than Chinese and American participants, with the 
Chinese no more indecisive than American participants. In sum, even when researchers 
use the same measure of general indecisiveness, the results remain inconsistent across 
studies. When interpreting these findings, however, there are certain issues that need to 
be considered.  
The first issue concerns the potential confounding of culture-contingent internal 
and external factors. There are two sources of cultural influences on chronic 
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indecisiveness – internal and external. First, people with certain cultural backgrounds 
may be more indecisive than people with other cultural backgrounds because of 
internalized cultural values or worldviews that can affect the perceived difficulty of 
choice and decision making. Second, certain cultural contexts may create the experience 
of decision difficulty because of environmental inputs. One source of greater decision 
difficulty could come from the society’s political system. Individuals in nations with 
more of a capitalist orientation tend to have a greater number of options available to 
them, compared to individuals in nations with more of a socialist orientation. A 
prototypical example is the United States, which is famous for the abundance of choices 
that are available in all aspects of life (Schwartz, 2004). From this perspective, it is 
reasonable to expect that people in the United States have to face a larger number of 
options when a choice needs to be made, and thus are more likely to be indecisive 
compared with people in mainland China, for example. On the other hand, it is possible 
that in environments in which people have to frequently choose from a large number of 
alternatives, people may become more experienced in decision making, and thus find it 
less demanding over time. In any case, an attempt to separate culture-contingent internal 
and external factors should be useful in gaining a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between culture and indecisiveness.  
When taking into consideration these two distinct types of cultural influences on 
indecisiveness, some insights into the seemingly inconsistent results of past research 
become possible. In the only study in which the socio-cultural environment was kept 
constant (i.e., the United States), participants of East Asian cultural backgrounds 
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experienced more indecisiveness than did participants of European cultural 
backgrounds. Hence, when the larger socio-political environment is held relatively 
constant, the results seem to suggest that there are culture-contingent internal factors that 
make East Asian Americans more indecisive. Comparing this study with the cross-
national study that tested mainland Chinese and American participants but revealed no 
cultural differences in chronic indecisiveness, it implies the possibility that, relative to 
the American context, the Chinese context may provide fewer choices and opportunities 
that makes decision-making less demanding. With regard to the previous cross-national 
study that found that Japanese participants were more indecisive than mainland Chinese 
participants (Yates et al., 2010), this may reflect a more capitalist system in Japan, 
compared with mainland China. Taking these factors into account, it seems that East 
Asians may be more indecisive than Westerners when the influence of culture-
contingent external factors is minimized.  
The second issue is that most of these studies did not test for the mediating effect 
of a cultural factor, rendering the reason for cultural differences unclear. The only 
exception is one study by Yates and colleagues (2010, Study 2), who found that social 
values associated with indecisive behaviours mediated the cultural differences in 
indecisiveness. However, it remains unclear exactly what cultural antecedents give rise 
to these social values, which in turn translate into indecisive behaviours. 
The third limitation concerns potential measurement biases. To the best of my 
knowledge, past cross-cultural studies on indecisiveness did not address measurement 
  
7 
 
invariance. Without first ensuring that no measurement item is culturally biased, group 
mean differences or lack thereof cannot be meaningfully interpreted.  
Naïve dialecticism and indecisiveness. The primary goal of the present 
dissertation was to isolate a culture-contingent internal factor that might explain cultural 
variations in indecisiveness. I proposed that naïve dialecticism, a set of lay theories of 
the world that is common among East Asians, might mediate the relationship between 
culture and indecisiveness. One way to conceptualize culture is that members from a 
cultural group tend to share implicit theories of the world; that is, they are likely to hold 
a common set of folk theories or naïve epistemologies that guide them to see, to know, 
and to reason about objects and events in their physical and social milieu. Individuals 
from a particular group acquire those lay theories through socialization and enculturation 
and this lay belief system differs substantially from culture to culture. The impact of 
culture-specific implicit theories on peoples’ thinking, judgment, and behaviour has 
been documented extensively (e.g., Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1999; Tata, 2000; 
Paletz, & Peng, 2008). One relevant construct that comes from research adopting an 
implicit theory approach to culture is that of naïve dialecticism (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; 
Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010). 
As influenced by Taoism, naïve dialecticism represents a lay belief system that 
guides East Asians to make sense of their world (Peng, Spencer-Rodgers, & Nian, 2006; 
Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010). Dialectical thinking1 encompasses three principles: 
                                                 
1 Naïve dialecticism, dialectical thinking, and dialectical worldview refer to the same construct and are 
used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
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principle of change, principle of holism, and principle of contradiction. By contrast, it 
has been suggested that Western people (e.g., European North Americans), as influenced 
distally by Aristotelian logic, endorse a set of lay theories of knowledge that emphasizes 
constancy, noncontradiction, and an excluded middle. In East Asian dialectical thinking, 
the principle of change suggests that our world is in constant flux. Consequently, objects 
and events are flexible and are always altering and changing. The principle of 
contradiction refers to a belief that as change is constant, contradiction ought to follow. 
Hence, two seemingly opposing things could coexist in harmony. The principle of 
holism states that as change and contradiction are constant, any object or event could not 
be isolated from the context. In essence, everything is connected to everything else, both 
temporally and spatially. The following Chinese proverb “Sāi Wēng Lost his Horse” 
nicely captures this dialectical worldview: 
Sāi Wēng lived on the border and he raised horses for a living. One day he lost a 
horse and his neighbour felt sorry for him, but Sāi Wēng didn’t care about the 
horse, because he thought it wasn’t a bad thing to lose a horse. After a while the 
horse returned with another beautiful horse, and the neighbour congratulated him 
on his good luck. But Sāi Wēng thought that maybe it wasn’t a good thing to 
have this new horse. His son liked the new horse a lot and often took it riding. 
One day his son fell off the horse and broke his leg. Because of his broken leg, 
he couldn’t go off to the war, as was expected of all the young men in the area. 
Most of them died. (“Chinese Proverbs – Sai”, 2009) 
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This proverb illustrates the principles of change and contradiction such that something 
seemingly good might become bad and something seemingly bad might become good. 
Thus, one never knows what is bad and what is good. 
Dialectical thinking tendency among Chinese people was empirically 
demonstrated in a series of studies conducted by Kaiping Peng and Richard Nisbett. In 
one study (Peng & Nisbett, 1999, Study 3), the authors examined culture-specific ways 
of social reasoning and their results render how the Chinese apply dialectical thinking in 
resolving social conflicts. They found, for example, that when confronted with mother-
daughter interpersonal conflict, American participants preferred a more 
noncompromising resolution (e.g., “the mother should pay more respect to the 
daughter’s freedom”), whereas Chinese participants were inclined toward a more 
compromising solution (e.g., “both parties should communicate more and pay more 
respect to each other’s concerns”). These authors also demonstrated that Chinese 
participants have greater tolerance of apparent contradiction than American participants 
(Peng & Nisbett, 1999, Study 5). The authors presented their participants with two 
scientific reports that were somewhat contradictory to each other but differed in 
plausibility. When they showed their participants the two reports separately, both 
Chinese and American participants rated the same one report as more plausible than the 
other. However, in another condition, they presented both reports to their participants 
and herein clear cultural differences emerged. For American participants, their belief of 
the more plausible article was greater relative to the other group of American 
participants who saw that article alone. It appears that Americans are more inclined to 
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make a principled choice between the two options such that their ratings of plausibility 
diverge, rendering a clear choice (even though their participants were not asked to 
choose one article to believe). However, when Chinese participants were shown the two 
pieces of contradicting information, their ratings of plausibility for both reports 
depolarize, or converged to a “middle ground” that was almost the same for the two 
reports, when compared to the Chinese participants who saw only one of the two 
passages alone. Peng and Nisbett’s results seem to suggest that Chinese tend to retain 
elements of both contradicting pieces of information rather than deciding to trust one 
piece of information and leaning toward that one side entirely. Similarly, other research 
suggests that not only do East Asians have greater tolerance for contradictory 
information and less inclination to resolve inconsistent viewpoints, they are also more 
inclined to have mixed emotions, especially negative emotions in seemingly positive 
situations (Bagozzi, Wong, & Yi, 1999; Hui, Fok, & Bond, 2009; Leu et al., 2010), 
compared with European North Americans.  
Tolerance for inconsistent information is also exhibited in how East Asians view 
and evaluate themselves. Choi and Choi (2002) demonstrated that Koreans are more 
flexible and inconsistent in their self-concepts. In particular, their Korean participants’ 
answers to personality measures were more influenced by the direction of the question 
when compared to their American counterparts. On the same note, Spencer-Rodgers, 
Peng, Wang, and Hou (2004) extended dialectical thinking tendency to self-evaluations 
of Chinese people. That is, it has been found that Chinese (vs. European American) 
participants exhibited more ambivalence (i.e., simultaneous positive and negative 
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evaluations; Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995) in their self-evaluations. The tendency 
to exhibit ambivalent self-evaluation among Chinese has also been found using implicit 
measures (Boucher, Peng, Shi, & Wang, 2009), thus making it unlikely that an 
acquiescent response bias is the main explanation for endorsing opposing items on a 
self-report questionnaire. In a similar vein, my earlier research has provided some 
evidence to suggest that, compared with European Canadians, East Asian Canadians are 
more likely to hold ambivalent attitudes toward some everyday objects (e.g., 
dormitories, cake, mosquitoes; Ng, Hynie, & McDonald, 2010), and are less motivated 
to resolve these conflicted evaluations (Ng, Hynie, & McDonald, 2012). 
If East Asians (vs. Westerners) are more likely to hold ambivalent attitudes 
because they recognize both positive and negative aspects of an object or an issue 
simultaneously, it may be more difficult for them to commit to an action and they may 
be more indecisive. For example, a person who holds a clearly positive or negative 
attitude toward dormitories may find it fairly easy to decide whether or not to live on 
campus. By comparison, a person who holds an ambivalent attitude toward dormitories 
may find it relatively more difficult to make this decision because neither alternative is 
entirely satisfying, and this person may feel pulled in opposite directions by his or her 
conflicting attitudinal components. There indeed is evidence to suggest this possibility. 
van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rotteveel, Nordgren, and van der Pligt (2009) found that 
ambivalence toward a new labour law induced psychological discomfort when a relevant 
decision needed to be made. This suggests the possibility that dialectical East Asians (vs. 
  
12 
 
Westerners) may be more likely to experience difficulty or stress when making a 
decision because of a higher inclination to evaluate objects ambivalently.  
Culture and Life Satisfaction 
In addition to explaining cultural differences in indecisiveness, another goal of 
the present dissertation was to explore how these differences might have negative 
downstream consequences for people’s well-being. There is substantial evidence that 
individuals of East Asian cultural backgrounds report lower levels of life satisfaction 
than those of European cultural backgrounds (e.g., Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995; Lee 
& Wu, 2008; Oishi, Akimoto, Richards, & Suh, 2013; Schkade & Kahneman, 1998). 
Cultural variations in life satisfaction are multiply determined. Life satisfaction has been 
found to be related to a number of variables, such as self-evaluative ambivalence 
(Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004), self-enhancing memory bias (Oishi, 2002), and the 
feeling that one is accurately understood by others (Oishi, Krochik, & Akimoto, 2010). 
However, I contend that general indecisiveness may also contribute to cultural 
differences in life satisfaction. 
Having problems making decisions can be a burden in people’s lives. First, 
indecisive (vs. decisive) individuals tend to gather more information before arriving at a 
decision (Rassin, Muris, Franken, Smit, & Wong, 2007). Because people generally need 
to make a large number of choices and decisions in the course of life, chronic 
indecisiveness will drain a lot of time and energy. Moreover, the tendency to experience 
post-decision regret, a marker of indecisiveness (Germeijs & de Boeck, 2002), may be 
especially likely to lower one’s life satisfaction. As a global evaluation of the degree to 
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which one is satisfied with his or her life, life satisfaction is unsurprisingly correlated 
with the degree of satisfaction in several important domains, including career (Lent et 
al., 2011), marriage (Shek, 1995), friends (Diener & Diener, 1995), and finances (Diener 
& Diener, 1995). If people have the inclination to doubt whether they have made the 
right choice across domains and situations, it follows that they should be less satisfied 
with their current choices and their life in general. Hence, compared to Westerners, if 
East Asians exhibit more general indecisiveness, they may also exhibit less life 
satisfaction. Indeed, a negative association between indecisiveness and life satisfaction 
was observed in a study conducted with Dutch participants (Rassin & Muris, 2005). 
Although a relationship between two variables observed within one culture does not 
necessarily mean that one variable would explain cultural differences in the other 
variable, their finding do suggest the possibility that lower life satisfaction among East 
Asians (vs. Westerners) can be explained in part by their higher indecisiveness.  
Research Overview 
The overall objective of the present research was to investigate cultural 
differences in indecisiveness. To control for the potential effects of culture-contingent 
external factors, such as the abundance of choices available in the environment, we 
conducted all studies in one location (i.e., Toronto, Canada) and compared indecisive 
tendencies between different ethnocultural groups. Moreover, measurement invariance 
was tested on all relevant scales.  
In Study 1, I examined how three markers of indecision – decision difficulty, 
post-decision regret, and decision latency (Germeijs & de Boeck, 2002) – might differ 
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across cultural groups in a real educational decision that was common to all participants 
choosing one’s program of study. In Study 2, I investigated how naïve dialecticism 
might contribute to cultural differences in chronic indecisiveness. In Study 3, I examined 
how cultural differences in chronic indecisiveness induced by naïve dialecticism might 
contribute to cultural differences in life satisfaction. In Study 4, I established the causal 
effect of naïve dialecticism on indecision in a consumer choice task and tested whether 
evaluative ambivalence toward the alternatives explained this effect.  
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Chapter 2 
Study 1 
In Study 1, in addition to testing participants in the same country to minimize the 
influence of culture-contingent external factors, I specifically examined one real-life 
decision that was common to all of our student participants (i.e., choice of university 
program) while statistically controlling for the number of alternatives. I hypothesized 
that East Asian Canadian students would experience more decision difficulty and post-
decision regret, and take a longer time to decide which university program to attend, 
compared with European Canadian students. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-nine students at York university in Toronto, Canada, including 23 East 
Asian Canadians (12 female, 11 male; Mage = 20.7 years) and 36 European Canadians 
(28 female, 8 male; Mage = 23.3 years), completed an online survey about their university 
application experience. For the 23 self-identified East Asian Canadian participants, 12 
were born in an East Asian country (e.g., South Korea) and 11 were born in Canada. For 
the 36 European Canadian participants, 29 were born in Canada and 7 were born in the 
United States or a European country (e.g., Hungary).  
Measures and Procedure 
Consenting participants first answered some demographic questions (e.g., 
gender, age, ethnicity). Participants then answered the following questions regarding 
their university application experience: (1a) “How many universities did you apply to in 
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the year before you started studying at the current university?” (1b) “For each university, 
please indicate the number of programs that you applied to.” (2) “In the year you 
accepted the offer to study at the current university, how many university/program offers 
did you receive?” (number of offers) (3) “Did you accept the offer from the current 
university before you received all your acceptance/rejection letters?” (4) “How many 
days after you received your final acceptance/rejection letter did it take for you to make 
your final decision?” (decision latency) (5) “Please indicate the degree of difficulty you 
experienced in deciding which university/program to attend.” (decision difficulty; 1 = 
very easy, 7 = very difficult) (6) “After you had chosen the university/program to attend 
and accepted the offer, did you believe that you had made the wrong choice?” (post-
decision regret; 1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Participants were also given the 
opportunity to describe the reasons behind their choice of university program as well as 
the thoughts and feelings that crossed their minds while they were making their 
decisions.2 All materials were presented in English. At the end of the experimental 
session, participants were thanked and fully debriefed.  
Results 
Data analyses were conducted on those who received multiple offers (68% of the 
total sample), including 16 East Asian Canadians (7 male, 9 female) and 24 European 
Canadians (7 male, 17 female).3 The proportion of those who received multiple offers 
                                                 
2 Responses did not suggest discernable differences between how East Asian Canadian students and 
European Canadian students selected their university programs. For both cultural groups, some common 
reasons behind their choice of university program include reputation of the school/program, opinions of 
their family/friends, and logistic concerns.  
3 Number of programs applied for did not differ between the two cultural groups (East Asian Canadians: 
M = 3.22, SD = 1.41; European Canadians: M = 2.94; SD = 1.47), t(57) = 0.71, p = .48, d = 0.19. Number 
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did not differ between cultures, 2(1, N = 59) = 0.54, p = .82. For those who received 
multiple offers, gender composition did not differ between cultures, 2(1, N = 40) = 
0.90, p = .34, and age did not differ between cultures4 (East Asian Canadians: M = 20.1, 
SD = 2.39; European Canadians: M = 22.1, SD = 5.98), t(36) = -1.23, p = .23, d = 0.44.  
One-way ANCOVAs with culture (East Asian vs. European) as the independent 
variable and number of offers as the covariate revealed the following findings5. First, 
East Asian Canadians (M = 4.63, SD = 2.03) experienced higher levels of decision 
difficulty than did European Canadians (M = 2.58, SD = 1.50), F(1, 37) = 12.49, p 
= .001, 
p
2  = .25, and number of offers was not a significant covariate, F(1, 37) = 0.13, p 
= .72, 
p
2  < .01. Second, East Asian Canadians (M = 3.44, SD = 2.16) experienced higher 
levels of post-decision regret6 than did European Canadians (M = 2.22, SD = 1.41), F(1, 
36) = 4.06, p = .05, 
p
2  = .10. Number of offers was not a significant covariate, F(1, 36) 
= 0.58, p =.45, 
p
2  = .02. Third, East Asian Canadians (M = 16.1 days, SD = 23.2 days) 
reported a longer decision latency7, compared with European Canadians (M = 5.2 days, 
                                                 
of offers received did not differ between the two cultural groups (East Asian Canadians: M = 2.48, SD = 
1.44; European Canadians: M = 2.19; SD = 1.28), t(57) = 0.79, p = .43, d = 0.21. After controlling for the 
number of programs applied for, the difference between the two cultural groups in the number of offers 
received remained statistically non-significant, F(1, 56) = 0.14, p = .72, 
p
2  < .01. 
4 One East Asian Canadian participant and one European Canadian participant did not report their age. 
5 The assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes was supported for all dependent variables, ps > .22. 
6 One European Canadian participant did not answer the post-decision regret question. 
7 Five participants did not answer the decision latency question. Decision latency was positively skewed, 
so this ANCOVA was conducted using the square root of decision latency as the dependent variable. If the 
original decision latency variable was used, results were marginally significant (culture: F(1, 32) = 3.72, p 
= .06, 
p
2  = .10; number of offers: F(1, 32) = 3.40, p = .08, 
p
2  = .10).  
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SD = 6.6 days), F(1, 32) = 5.84, p = .02, 
p
2  = .15. Here, number of offers was a 
significant positive covariate, F(1, 32) = 4.18, p = .05, 
p
2  = .12.  
Finally, decision difficulty, post-decision regret, and decision latency were 
positively correlated among each other for both cultural groups (rs ranged from .40 
to .79; see Table 1), consistent to the contention that these are all manifestations of 
indecisiveness (Germeijs & de Boeck, 2002).  
Discussion 
The present results are consistent with research evidence that in North America, 
individuals of East Asian cultural backgrounds reported more chronic indecisiveness 
than those of European cultural backgrounds (Wengrovitz & Patalano, 2004, as cited in 
Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2006). Extending previous research, in the present study, we 
examined a real-life decision while statistically controlling for the number of alternatives 
and found that East Asian Canadian participants exhibited different manifestations of 
indecisiveness (i.e., decision difficulty, post-decision regret, decision latency) to a higher 
degree than did European Canadian participants.  
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Table 1. Correlations among Variables in Study 1 
  Decision Latency Decision Difficulty 
 East Asian Canadians 
Decision Difficulty .47*  
Post-Decision Regret .44 .79*** 
 European Canadians 
Decision Difficulty .40*  
Post-Decision Regret .40* .59*** 
Note: *p < .05 (two-tailed); **p < .01 (two-tailed); ***p < .001 (two-tailed) 
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Chapter 3 
Study 28 
In Study 2 I investigated cultural differences in chronic indecisiveness and how 
naïve dialecticism may contribute to these differences by comparing East Asian 
Canadians, South Asian Canadians, and European Canadians. It is theoretically 
informative to look at a third cultural group to enrich a two-culture comparison. South 
Asian culture was included as a second control group because South Asian culture, in 
many respects, is more similar to East Asian culture (e.g., collectivism, power distance, 
Hofstede, 2001) than to North American culture. Yet, East Asian and South Asian 
cultures differ in philosophical and religious traditions. Specifically, as naïve 
dialecticism is believed to have originated in Taoism, the increased indecisive tendency 
might be an exclusively East Asian phenomenon. For this reason, I expected that East 
Asian Canadians would exhibit higher levels of chronic indecisiveness than would 
European Canadians and South Asian Canadians. If South Asian Canadians exhibited 
levels of indecisiveness similar to European Canadians but significantly lower than that 
of East Asian Canadians, increased levels of indecisiveness among East Asian 
Canadians should not be related to other cultural characteristics that are supposed to be 
shared by East Asian and South Asian cultures, such as collectivism (Hofstede, 2001). 
In addition to naïve dialecticism, I also examined another variable that might 
influence cultural variations in general indecisiveness; that is, need for cognition, or the 
“tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors” (Cacioppo & Petty, 
                                                 
8 This study was published in Ng & Hynie (2014). 
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1982). Sanders, Gass, Wiseman, and Bruschke (1992) found that their Asian American 
participants9 reported lower need for cognition than did their European American and 
Hispanic American participants. People who are high in need for cognition expend more 
effort to process issue-relevant information, and their attitudes toward an issue are more 
predictive of their issue relevant behaviour at a later time (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & 
Rodriguez, 1986). Moreover, Weary and Edwards (1994) found that people who are 
intrinsically motivated to expend cognitive effort are less likely to have a feeling of 
uncertainty. As feeling uncertain about an issue can be conceived of as an aspect of 
indecisiveness, it is reasonable to expect that people who are relatively high in need for 
cognition would also be relatively low in indecisiveness. Indeed, more recent research 
did find a negative correlation between need for cognition and indecisiveness (Curşeu, 
2006). Thus, it is also important to examine cultural differences in need for cognition 
and how these might contribute to cultural variations in indecisiveness, and whether 
naïve dialecticism is still a significant mechanism underlying cultural differences in 
indecisiveness when the effect of need for cognition is controlled for. Furthermore, as 
people who are more (vs. less) intrinsically motivated to engage in cognitive activities 
may be more inclined to resolve opposing or seemingly contradictory viewpoints, they 
may be less likely to endorse both of these contradictory beliefs. Hence, I also expected 
that need for cognition might be negatively associated with naïve dialecticism. 
                                                 
9 Sanders and colleagues (1992) did not differentiate between East Asian Americans and South Asian 
Americans, so their Asian American sample might include Americans of both East Asian and South Asian 
cultural backgrounds. 
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To the best of my knowledge, there is no prior research examining cultural 
differences in naïve dialecticism between East Asians and South Asians. However, 
because naïve dialecticism is grounded in East Asian philosophies (Peng & Nisbett, 
1999), I predicted that East Asian Canadians would be more dialectical and thus more 
indecisive, compared with South Asian Canadians. Hence, I made the following 
hypotheses: (H1) East Asian Canadians would exhibit more naïve dialecticism than 
European Canadians and South Asian Canadians; (H2) East Asian Canadians would 
exhibit more chronic indecisiveness than European Canadians and South Asian 
Canadians; and (H3) naïve dialecticism would mediate the relationship between culture 
and indecisiveness. 
As mentioned above, one limitation of previous research on culture and chronic 
indecisiveness concerns potential measurement biases. My reading of the literature 
indicates that past studies in this area did not address measurement invariance (van de 
Vijver & Leung, 1997). Without first ensuring that no measurement item in a scale is 
culturally biased, group mean differences (or lack thereof) cannot be meaningfully 
interpreted as true differences (or lack thereof) in the latent construct concerned (Byrne 
& Watkins, 2003). To address this issue, measurement invariance was tested on all 
scales in this and subsequent studies.  
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and three European Canadian students (147 female, 56 male), 209 
East Asian Canadian students (120 female, 89 male), and 99 South Asian Canadian 
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students (69 female, 30 male) participated in this study. Gender composition differed 
among the three cultural groups, Gender: 2(2, N = 511) = 11.13, p <.01. For the 203 
self-identified European Canadian participants, 159 were born in Canada and 44 were 
born in the United States or a European country (e.g., Croatia). For the 209 self-
identified East Asian Canadian participants, 84 were born in an East Asian country (e.g., 
China) and 121 were born in Canada10. For the 99 self-identified South Asian Canadian 
participants, 45 were born in a South Asian country (e.g., Bangladesh) and 54 were born 
in Canada. Age differed among the three cultural groups (European Canadians11: M = 
19.9, SD = 3.79; East Asian Canadians12: M = 19.1, SD = 1.79; South Asian 
Canadians13: M = 18.8, SD = 1.43), F(2, 493) = 6.76, p < .01, 
p
2  = .03. Post-hoc 
analyses with p-values adjusted for multiple comparisons using Sidak correction 
revealed that European Canadian participants were statistically significantly older than 
both East Asian Canadian participants, p = .01, and South Asian Canadian participants, p 
= .01, while the latter two groups did not differ from each other, p = .81. The effects of 
gender and age were therefore estimated in all analyses. All participants were recruited 
from the undergraduate psychology participant pool of York University in Toronto. 
Measures 
Naïve dialecticism. Individual differences in naïve dialecticism were assessed 
using the 32-item Dialectical Self Scale (DSS; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2011; see 
                                                 
10 Four East Asian Canadian participants did not answer the country of birth question. 
11 Three European Canadian participants did not provide their age. 
12 Nine East Asian Canadian participants did not provide their age. 
13 Three South Asian Canadian participants did not provide their age. 
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Appendix A), which uses a 7-point response scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree). Sample items include: “When I hear two sides of an argument, I often agree with 
both” and “There are always two sides to everything, depending on how you look at it.” 
The DSS has been demonstrated to possess good reliability (s ranged from .69 to .87; 
Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Peng, & Wang, 2009) and predictive validity (Spencer-
Rodgers et al., 2004). 
Need for cognition. Need for cognition was measured by the Need for Cognition 
scale (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; see Appendix B), consisting of 18 items rated on a 
5-point response scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Sample items include: 
“I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours” and “I only think as hard as I 
have to” (reverse-scored). The NFC has been shown to have good reliability (s ranged 
from .74 to .97), and convergent and discriminant validity (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & 
Jarvis, 1996). 
Indecisiveness. Consistent with most prior research, I used the Indecisiveness 
Scale (IS; Frost & Shows, 1993; see Appendix C) to assess individual differences in 
general indecisiveness. The IS consists of 15 items, rated on a 7-point response scale (1 
= strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Sample items include: “I become anxious when 
making a decision” and “I try to put off making decisions.” The IS has been 
demonstrated to possess good reliability (Frost & Shows, 1993; .86, Rassin 
& Muris, 2005) and predictive validity (Frost & Shows, 1993). 
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Procedure 
After indicating consent, participants completed an online survey including a 
brief demographics questionnaire (e.g., gender, age, racial background), the DSS, the 
NFC, and the IS (see Table 2 for s) for course credit. All materials were presented in 
English. At the end of the study, participants were thanked and fully debriefed.  
Results 
Differential Item Functioning Analyses  
There is increasing attention being paid to ensuring that scale scores are 
comparable between groups in cross-cultural research. A commonly adopted method in 
assessing measurement invariance is statistical analyses of item response data. Mean 
differences can be meaningfully interpreted only when no item functions differentially 
across the cultural groups. In other words, respondents from different cultural 
backgrounds with the same level of the latent construct should have the same probability 
of endorsing an item (or having the same score for that item). The absence of these 
equivalent probabilities is known as differential item functioning (DIF), and when DIF is 
detected in one or more items of an instrument cross-cultural comparisons using the 
observed mean scores will be biased by the differentially functioning items. Ordinal 
logistic regression is commonly used to detect DIF (Zumbo, 1999) and this was the   
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Study 2 
 
European 
Canadians 
East Asian 
Canadians 
South Asian 
Canadians 
  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Need for 
Cognition Scale 
.89 3.21 0.64 .82 3.02 0.50 .78 3.20 0.46 
 
Dialectical Self 
Scale 
.74 3.70 0.51 .77 3.95 0.49 .80 3.78 0.56 
 
Indecisiveness 
Scale 
.87 2.93 0.68 .84 3.18 0.60 .85 2.95 0.63 
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approach adopted in the present research. Briefly, a set of logistic regression models are 
fitted on each item to detect uniform DIF and non-uniform DIF. In Model 1, the item 
score is regressed onto the total score. In Model 2, the item score is regressed onto both 
the total score and group membership. In Model 3, the item score is regressed onto the 
total score, group membership, and their interaction term. Model comparisons, using 
likelihood ratio chi-square tests, are then conducted to evaluate potential DIF. 
Specifically, a difference between Models 1 and 2 indicates uniform DIF because group 
membership explains additional variance of item scores above and beyond what the 
latent score explains. Difference between Models 2 and 3, on the other hand, indicates a 
non-uniform DIF because the interaction term explains additional variance of item 
scores above and beyond what the main effects explain, suggesting that the effect of 
group membership depends on the level of the latent construct. Finally, total DIF (the 
combination of uniform DIF and non-uniform DIF) is tested by comparing Models 1 and 
3. It has been recommended that both statistical significance and effect size should be 
taken into account in determining whether an item is differentially functioning across 
groups.  
All DIF analyses were performed using an SPSS Macro (Zumbo, 1999). For each 
item, three likelihood ratio 2 statistics (Model 1 vs. Model 2 for uniform DIF; Model 2 
vs. Model 3 for non-uniform DIF; Model 1 vs. Model 3 for total DIF) and three 
associated pseudo-R2 values were used to evaluate the presence of DIF. According to 
Zumbo (1999), an item is classified as displaying DIF when p < .01 (to control for 
inflated familywise error) and pseudo-R2 > .13. As there were three cultural groups in 
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this study, three different sets of DIF tests were conducted with two cultural groups 
being compared at a time.  
Need for Cognition Scale. Focusing on total DIF (Model 1 vs. Model 3), which 
provides an overall test of DIF (i.e., including the effects of both uniform-DIF and non-
uniform-DIF), no item functioned differentially across cultural groups. Comparing 
responses from European Canadian and East Asian Canadian participants, the likelihood 
ratio 2 statistic was statistically significant for two items, ps < .01, but with small effect 
sizes, pseudo-R2s < .04 (see Table 3). Comparing responses from European Canadian 
and South Asian Canadian participants, the likelihood ratio 2 statistic was statistically 
non-significant for all items, ps > .01, pseudo-R2s < .03 (see Table 4). Comparing 
responses from East Asian Canadian and South Asian Canadian participants, likelihood 
ratio 2 statistics was statistically non-significant for all items, ps > .02, pseudo-R2s < 
.03 (see Table 5). Moreover, no item functioned differentially across gender groups; the 
likelihood ratio 2 statistic was statistically significant for two items, ps < .01, but with 
small effect sizes, pseudo-R2s < .03 (see Table 6). 
Dialectical Self Scale. Focusing on total DIF (Model 1 vs. Model 3), no item 
functioned differentially across cultural groups. Comparing responses from European 
Canadian and East Asian Canadian participants, the likelihood ratio 2 statistic was 
statistically significant for five items, ps < .01, but with small effect sizes, pseudo-R2s < 
.05 (see Table 7). Comparing responses from European Canadian and South Asian 
Canadian participants, likelihood ratio 2 statistic was statistically significant for one  
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 168.49 0.37 175.93 0.38 177.35 0.38 7.44 0.01 0.01 1.43 0.00 0.23 8.86 0.02 0.01
2 224.40 0.47 224.70 0.47 228.33 0.47 0.31 0.00 0.58 3.63 0.01 0.06 3.93 0.01 0.14
3 180.32 0.39 181.77 0.39 182.91 0.40 1.45 0.00 0.23 1.14 0.00 0.29 2.58 0.00 0.27
4 297.87 0.57 300.40 0.57 301.66 0.58 2.53 0.00 0.11 1.26 0.00 0.26 3.79 0.01 0.15
5 234.43 0.47 240.21 0.48 240.42 0.48 5.79 0.01 0.02 0.21 0.00 0.65 6.00 0.01 0.05
6 123.78 0.28 132.46 0.30 139.15 0.31 8.69 0.02 0.00 6.69 0.01 0.01 15.37 0.03 0.00
7 164.86 0.36 177.55 0.38 177.72 0.38 12.69 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.68 12.86 0.02 0.00
8 84.71 0.20 88.02 0.21 89.73 0.21 3.31 0.00 0.07 1.70 0.00 0.19 5.02 0.01 0.08
9 151.83 0.35 154.75 0.35 155.08 0.35 2.92 0.01 0.09 0.33 0.00 0.57 3.25 0.01 0.20
10 125.87 0.29 127.39 0.29 127.69 0.29 1.53 0.00 0.22 0.30 0.00 0.58 1.83 0.00 0.40
11 216.32 0.47 216.53 0.47 217.84 0.48 0.20 0.00 0.65 1.31 0.00 0.25 1.51 0.00 0.47
12 211.45 0.44 212.86 0.45 215.32 0.45 1.41 0.00 0.24 2.46 0.01 0.12 3.87 0.01 0.14
13 144.75 0.32 146.29 0.33 149.39 0.33 1.54 0.00 0.21 3.10 0.00 0.08 4.64 0.01 0.10
14 167.29 0.37 167.47 0.37 169.49 0.37 0.18 0.00 0.67 2.02 0.00 0.16 2.20 0.00 0.33
15 201.35 0.44 201.36 0.44 201.52 0.44 0.01 0.00 0.94 0.16 0.00 0.69 0.16 0.00 0.92
16 72.98 0.17 73.09 0.17 80.44 0.19 0.11 0.00 0.73 7.35 0.02 0.01 7.46 0.02 0.02
17 130.31 0.29 130.69 0.29 134.09 0.30 0.37 0.00 0.54 3.40 0.01 0.07 3.78 0.01 0.15
18 34.71 0.09 34.71 0.09 35.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.57 0.33 0.00 0.85
Table 3. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Need for Cognition Scale between European Canadians and East Asian Canadians
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 130.72 0.38 136.21 0.39 137.97 0.40 5.49 0.01 0.02 1.77 0.00 0.18 7.25 0.02 0.03
2 189.46 0.52 189.52 0.52 189.65 0.52 0.06 0.00 0.80 0.12 0.00 0.73 0.19 0.00 0.91
3 119.37 0.37 119.47 0.37 119.49 0.37 0.09 0.00 0.76 0.02 0.00 0.88 0.12 0.00 0.94
4 206.96 0.55 208.99 0.55 209.14 0.55 2.02 0.00 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.69 2.18 0.00 0.34
5 150.33 0.42 151.91 0.42 152.00 0.42 1.59 0.00 0.21 0.09 0.00 0.77 1.67 0.00 0.43
6 127.03 0.37 129.41 0.38 130.58 0.39 2.38 0.01 0.12 1.17 0.00 0.28 3.55 0.01 0.17
7 126.90 0.36 134.73 0.38 135.63 0.38 7.83 0.02 0.01 0.90 0.00 0.34 8.73 0.02 0.01
8 46.67 0.16 46.74 0.16 46.97 0.16 0.07 0.00 0.79 0.23 0.00 0.63 0.30 0.00 0.86
9 104.39 0.33 104.56 0.33 108.68 0.34 0.17 0.00 0.68 4.13 0.01 0.04 4.29 0.01 0.12
10 102.76 0.33 102.84 0.33 102.91 0.33 0.08 0.00 0.77 0.07 0.00 0.79 0.15 0.00 0.93
11 149.00 0.45 157.03 0.46 157.05 0.46 8.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.89 8.05 0.01 0.02
12 185.73 0.51 186.05 0.51 186.15 0.51 0.32 0.00 0.57 0.10 0.00 0.75 0.43 0.00 0.81
13 87.34 0.27 87.36 0.27 87.52 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.88 0.16 0.00 0.69 0.18 0.00 0.91
14 111.74 0.34 112.00 0.34 112.94 0.34 0.26 0.00 0.61 0.94 0.00 0.33 1.21 0.00 0.55
15 142.26 0.42 142.79 0.42 142.81 0.42 0.53 0.00 0.47 0.02 0.00 0.89 0.54 0.00 0.76
16 82.08 0.25 84.65 0.26 84.65 0.26 2.57 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.96 2.58 0.01 0.28
17 80.07 0.24 80.59 0.24 80.96 0.24 0.52 0.00 0.47 0.37 0.00 0.54 0.88 0.00 0.64
18 24.36 0.08 24.38 0.08 24.60 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.90 0.21 0.00 0.64 0.23 0.00 0.89
Table 4. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Need for Cognition Scale between European Canadians and South Asian Canadians
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 87.16 0.26 87.33 0.26 87.64 0.26 0.17 0.00 0.68 0.31 0.00 0.58 0.48 0.00 0.79
2 115.52 0.34 116.37 0.34 117.96 0.35 0.86 0.00 0.35 1.59 0.00 0.21 2.44 0.01 0.29
3 101.27 0.31 103.04 0.32 103.35 0.31 1.77 0.01 0.18 0.31 0.00 0.58 2.08 0.00 0.35
4 184.75 0.51 184.89 0.51 185.14 0.51 0.14 0.00 0.71 0.25 0.00 0.62 0.39 0.00 0.82
5 150.39 0.42 150.78 0.43 150.78 0.43 0.38 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.39 0.00 0.82
6 52.15 0.17 52.68 0.18 53.33 0.18 0.52 0.00 0.47 0.66 0.00 0.42 1.18 0.00 0.55
7 95.32 0.30 95.33 0.30 97.10 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.91 1.77 0.00 0.18 1.78 0.00 0.41
8 58.13 0.19 59.67 0.19 61.79 0.20 1.54 0.00 0.21 2.12 0.01 0.15 3.66 0.02 0.16
9 64.56 0.22 65.16 0.22 67.36 0.22 0.60 0.00 0.44 2.20 0.01 0.14 2.80 0.01 0.25
10 70.09 0.22 71.02 0.23 71.02 0.23 0.93 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.93 0.00 0.63
11 111.68 0.35 118.56 0.37 118.82 0.37 6.88 0.02 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.61 7.14 0.02 0.03
12 115.33 0.35 115.40 0.35 117.19 0.35 0.07 0.00 0.79 1.79 0.01 0.18 1.86 0.01 0.39
13 108.18 0.31 109.07 0.32 109.88 0.32 0.89 0.00 0.35 0.81 0.00 0.37 1.70 0.00 0.43
14 146.11 0.42 146.26 0.42 146.27 0.42 0.16 0.00 0.69 0.01 0.00 0.93 0.16 0.00 0.92
15 107.88 0.35 108.24 0.35 108.25 0.35 0.36 0.00 0.55 0.01 0.00 0.93 0.37 0.00 0.83
16 22.79 0.08 23.84 0.08 27.63 0.09 1.05 0.00 0.31 3.79 0.01 0.05 4.84 0.02 0.09
17 97.71 0.29 98.78 0.29 99.43 0.29 1.07 0.00 0.30 0.65 0.00 0.42 1.72 0.01 0.42
18 16.14 0.05 16.15 0.05 16.15 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Table 5. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Need for Cognition Scale between East Asian Canadians and South Asian Canadians
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 192.38 0.34 199.74 0.35 202.56 0.36 7.36 0.01 0.01 2.82 0.01 0.09 10.18 0.02 0.01
2 267.53 0.45 267.57 0.45 267.82 0.45 0.04 0.00 0.84 0.25 0.00 0.62 0.29 0.00 0.87
3 199.60 0.36 199.60 0.36 199.77 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.17 0.00 0.68 0.17 0.00 0.92
4 348.50 0.55 351.22 0.55 352.01 0.55 2.73 0.00 0.10 0.79 0.00 0.37 3.51 0.00 0.17
5 272.25 0.45 275.12 0.45 275.40 0.45 2.87 0.00 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.60 3.15 0.00 0.21
6 148.14 0.28 152.05 0.28 156.08 0.29 3.90 0.01 0.05 4.04 0.01 0.04 7.94 0.01 0.02
7 199.25 0.35 209.91 0.36 210.53 0.37 10.67 0.01 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.43 11.29 0.01 0.00
8 97.18 0.19 97.60 0.19 97.66 0.19 0.41 0.00 0.52 0.06 0.00 0.80 0.48 0.00 0.79
9 160.18 0.30 160.63 0.30 164.67 0.31 0.45 0.00 0.50 4.05 0.01 0.04 4.49 0.01 0.11
10 151.83 0.29 152.05 0.29 152.20 0.29 0.22 0.00 0.64 0.15 0.00 0.70 0.36 0.00 0.83
11 240.87 0.43 248.17 0.44 248.27 0.44 7.30 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.75 7.40 0.01 0.02
12 257.33 0.44 257.97 0.44 258.19 0.44 0.64 0.00 0.42 0.22 0.00 0.64 0.86 0.00 0.65
13 168.38 0.30 168.60 0.30 169.41 0.30 0.22 0.00 0.64 0.81 0.00 0.37 1.04 0.00 0.60
14 211.91 0.38 212.23 0.38 214.15 0.38 0.32 0.00 0.57 1.93 0.00 0.17 2.25 0.00 0.33
15 228.67 0.41 229.08 0.41 229.19 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.52 0.11 0.00 0.74 0.52 0.00 0.77
16 87.09 0.17 89.26 0.17 90.48 0.17 2.17 0.00 0.14 1.22 0.00 0.27 3.39 0.01 0.18
17 153.53 0.27 153.76 0.27 155.52 0.28 0.23 0.00 0.63 1.76 0.00 0.18 1.99 0.00 0.37
18 37.78 0.08 37.79 0.08 38.12 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.91 0.32 0.00 0.57 0.34 0.00 0.84
Table 6. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Need for Cognition Scale between females and males
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 73.08 0.16 73.08 0.16 73.37 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.29 0.00 0.59 0.29 0.00 0.87
2 55.31 0.13 56.43 0.13 56.43 0.13 1.12 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.97 1.13 0.00 0.57
3 2.77 0.01 10.46 0.02 10.80 0.03 7.69 0.02 0.01 0.34 0.00 0.56 8.03 0.02 0.02
4 41.24 0.10 42.94 0.11 47.88 0.11 1.70 0.00 0.19 4.94 0.01 0.03 6.64 0.01 0.04
5 125.29 0.27 125.70 0.28 126.57 0.28 0.41 0.00 0.52 0.87 0.00 0.35 1.28 0.00 0.53
6 65.15 0.16 65.34 0.16 66.11 0.16 0.20 0.00 0.66 0.76 0.00 0.38 0.96 0.00 0.62
7 53.92 0.13 53.92 0.13 56.45 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.95 2.52 0.00 0.11 2.53 0.00 0.28
8 89.35 0.20 90.62 0.20 97.54 0.21 1.28 0.00 0.26 6.91 0.01 0.01 8.19 0.01 0.02
9 130.78 0.29 134.09 0.29 134.41 0.29 3.31 0.00 0.07 0.32 0.00 0.57 3.63 0.00 0.16
10 30.19 0.08 31.32 0.08 31.45 0.08 1.13 0.00 0.29 0.13 0.00 0.72 1.26 0.00 0.53
11 79.07 0.18 79.43 0.18 79.95 0.18 0.36 0.00 0.55 0.52 0.00 0.47 0.88 0.00 0.64
12 73.71 0.18 74.47 0.18 84.12 0.20 0.76 0.00 0.38 9.66 0.02 0.00 10.42 0.02 0.01
13 150.11 0.32 155.49 0.33 159.13 0.34 5.38 0.01 0.02 3.64 0.01 0.06 9.02 0.02 0.01
14 167.59 0.34 176.82 0.36 177.22 0.36 9.23 0.02 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.53 9.63 0.02 0.01
15 146.99 0.31 159.96 0.33 161.06 0.34 12.97 0.02 0.00 1.11 0.00 0.29 14.08 0.02 0.00
16 144.09 0.31 148.76 0.31 149.28 0.32 4.67 0.01 0.03 0.52 0.00 0.47 5.19 0.01 0.07
17 76.13 0.19 76.27 0.19 76.79 0.19 0.14 0.00 0.71 0.52 0.00 0.47 0.66 0.00 0.72
18 79.66 0.18 88.08 0.20 89.05 0.20 8.42 0.02 0.00 0.97 0.01 0.32 9.39 0.02 0.01
19 52.89 0.12 55.11 0.13 59.59 0.14 2.21 0.01 0.14 4.48 0.01 0.03 6.69 0.01 0.04
20 18.87 0.05 27.88 0.07 28.02 0.07 9.01 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.71 9.15 0.02 0.01
21 110.04 0.24 112.99 0.25 117.17 0.25 2.96 0.00 0.09 4.18 0.01 0.04 7.14 0.01 0.03
22 38.84 0.10 55.81 0.14 55.87 0.14 16.97 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.81 17.03 0.04 0.00
23 94.22 0.21 94.23 0.21 94.93 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.70 0.00 0.40 0.70 0.00 0.70
24 22.80 0.05 23.29 0.06 23.87 0.06 0.49 0.00 0.49 0.58 0.00 0.45 1.07 0.00 0.59
25 45.09 0.11 47.49 0.11 47.50 0.11 2.40 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.94 2.41 0.01 0.30
26 75.11 0.18 75.33 0.18 76.20 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.64 0.88 0.00 0.35 1.10 0.00 0.58
27 1.15 0.00 1.30 0.00 1.31 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.69 0.01 0.00 0.92 0.17 0.00 0.92
28 33.54 0.08 33.63 0.08 34.67 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.77 1.05 0.00 0.31 1.13 0.00 0.57
29 39.80 0.09 40.18 0.09 43.85 0.10 0.38 0.00 0.54 3.67 0.01 0.06 4.06 0.01 0.13
30 59.80 0.15 62.23 0.15 64.71 0.16 2.43 0.01 0.12 2.48 0.01 0.12 4.91 0.01 0.09
31 50.57 0.12 52.43 0.12 52.89 0.13 1.86 0.00 0.17 0.46 0.00 0.50 2.32 0.00 0.31
32 0.32 0.00 1.04 0.00 1.05 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.73 0.00 0.70
Table 7. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Dialectical Self Scale between European Canadians and East Asian Canadians
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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item, p < .01, with a small effect size, pseudo-R2 = .04 (see Table 8). Comparing 
responses from East Asian Canadian and South Asian Canadian participants, the 
likelihood ratio 2 statistic was statistically significant for one item, p < .001, but with a 
small effect size, pseudo-R2 = .05 (see Table 9). Moreover, no item functioned 
differentially across gender groups; the likelihood ratio 2 statistic was statistically 
significant for one item, p = .001, but with a small effect size, pseudo-R2s = .03 (see 
Table 10). 
Indecisiveness Scale. Focusing on total DIF (Model 1 vs. Model 3), no item 
functioned differentially across cultural groups. Comparing responses from European 
Canadian and East Asian Canadian participants, the likelihood ratio 2 statistic was 
statistically significant for three items, ps < .01, but with small effect sizes, pseudo-R2s < 
.04 (see Table 11). Comparing responses from European Canadian and South Asian 
Canadian participants, the likelihood ratio 2 statistics was statistically significant for 
one item, p < .001, but with a small effect size, pseudo-R2 = .05 (see Table 12). 
Comparing responses from East Asian Canadian and South Asian Canadian participants, 
the likelihood ratio 2 statistics was statistically significant for one item, p < .01, but 
with a small effect size, pseudo-R2 = .02 (see Table 13). Moreover, no item functioned 
differentially across gender groups; the likelihood ratio 2 statistic was statistically 
significant for one item, p < .001, but with a small effect size, pseudo-R2s = .03 (see 
Table 14).
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 68.91 0.20 70.89 0.21 71.61 0.22 1.98 0.01 0.16 0.72 0.00 0.40 2.70 0.01 0.26
2 37.59 0.12 37.88 0.12 38.30 0.12 0.29 0.00 0.59 0.42 0.00 0.52 0.71 0.00 0.70
3 0.14 0.00 1.77 0.01 2.79 0.01 1.63 0.01 0.20 1.01 0.00 0.31 2.64 0.01 0.27
4 18.40 0.06 18.54 0.06 18.91 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.71 0.37 0.00 0.55 0.51 0.00 0.78
5 76.91 0.23 79.73 0.24 79.76 0.24 2.81 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.86 2.84 0.01 0.24
6 48.63 0.16 48.69 0.16 49.31 0.16 0.07 0.00 0.80 0.61 0.00 0.43 0.68 0.00 0.71
7 32.94 0.11 33.38 0.11 35.14 0.12 0.44 0.00 0.51 1.76 0.01 0.18 2.20 0.01 0.33
8 39.22 0.13 43.90 0.14 44.21 0.14 4.69 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.00 0.58 4.99 0.01 0.08
9 76.72 0.24 76.72 0.24 77.67 0.24 0.01 0.00 0.93 0.94 0.00 0.33 0.95 0.00 0.62
10 18.60 0.06 25.48 0.08 25.79 0.08 6.89 0.02 0.01 0.30 0.00 0.58 7.19 0.02 0.03
11 51.23 0.16 52.04 0.16 52.04 0.16 0.81 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.82 0.00 0.66
12 68.76 0.22 68.90 0.22 71.30 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.71 2.41 0.00 0.12 2.55 0.00 0.28
13 123.53 0.35 124.03 0.35 124.11 0.35 0.50 0.00 0.48 0.08 0.00 0.78 0.58 0.00 0.75
14 104.22 0.30 105.27 0.30 105.77 0.30 1.04 0.00 0.31 0.51 0.00 0.48 1.55 0.00 0.46
15 91.47 0.27 91.52 0.27 91.94 0.27 0.06 0.00 0.81 0.42 0.00 0.52 0.48 0.00 0.79
16 107.01 0.32 107.09 0.32 107.11 0.32 0.08 0.00 0.78 0.02 0.00 0.88 0.10 0.00 0.95
17 62.25 0.20 62.29 0.20 62.30 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.85 0.01 0.00 0.91 0.05 0.00 0.98
18 54.05 0.17 54.11 0.17 54.17 0.17 0.06 0.00 0.80 0.06 0.00 0.80 0.12 0.00 0.94
19 58.05 0.18 58.77 0.18 59.32 0.18 0.72 0.00 0.40 0.55 0.00 0.46 1.27 0.00 0.53
20 20.85 0.07 30.13 0.10 32.14 0.11 9.27 0.03 0.00 2.02 0.01 0.16 11.29 0.04 0.00
21 99.58 0.28 101.88 0.29 103.12 0.29 2.30 0.01 0.13 1.24 0.00 0.26 3.54 0.01 0.17
22 20.39 0.07 21.63 0.07 23.91 0.08 1.24 0.00 0.27 2.29 0.01 0.13 3.53 0.01 0.17
23 79.35 0.23 79.95 0.23 79.95 0.23 0.60 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.74
24 23.00 0.08 23.34 0.08 27.78 0.09 0.34 0.00 0.56 4.44 0.01 0.04 4.78 0.02 0.09
25 37.77 0.12 41.38 0.13 41.80 0.14 3.61 0.01 0.06 0.41 0.00 0.52 4.03 0.02 0.13
26 63.92 0.20 63.94 0.20 63.97 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.87 0.03 0.00 0.86 0.06 0.00 0.97
27 0.98 0.00 1.07 0.00 1.12 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.77 0.05 0.00 0.83 0.13 0.00 0.94
28 29.46 0.10 29.74 0.10 33.74 0.11 0.28 0.00 0.60 4.00 0.01 0.05 4.28 0.01 0.12
29 15.62 0.05 17.12 0.06 17.64 0.06 1.50 0.01 0.22 0.52 0.00 0.47 2.02 0.01 0.36
30 50.43 0.17 52.59 0.17 53.53 0.18 2.16 0.01 0.14 0.94 0.00 0.33 3.09 0.01 0.21
31 19.25 0.07 23.93 0.08 25.63 0.08 4.68 0.01 0.03 1.70 0.01 0.19 6.38 0.02 0.04
32 2.24 0.01 2.46 0.01 3.22 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.64 0.77 0.00 0.38 0.99 0.00 0.61
Table 8. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Dialectical Self Scale between European Canadians and South Asian Canadians
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 58.35 0.17 60.92 0.18 62.73 0.18 2.57 0.01 0.11 1.82 0.01 0.18 4.39 0.01 0.11
2 35.70 0.11 35.73 0.11 36.12 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.87 0.39 0.00 0.53 0.41 0.00 0.81
3 0.16 0.00 15.40 0.05 15.69 0.05 15.25 0.05 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.59 15.54 0.05 0.00
4 51.78 0.16 54.62 0.17 56.83 0.18 2.84 0.01 0.09 2.21 0.01 0.14 5.05 0.02 0.08
5 82.70 0.25 84.26 0.26 84.71 0.26 1.56 0.00 0.21 0.45 0.00 0.50 2.01 0.01 0.37
6 42.02 0.14 42.12 0.14 42.12 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.00 0.95
7 59.44 0.18 60.62 0.19 60.63 0.19 1.18 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.96 1.19 0.01 0.55
8 107.90 0.30 109.92 0.31 113.74 0.32 2.02 0.00 0.16 3.82 0.01 0.05 5.84 0.01 0.05
9 73.45 0.22 76.06 0.23 76.60 0.23 2.61 0.01 0.11 0.53 0.00 0.47 3.15 0.01 0.21
10 14.71 0.05 18.31 0.07 18.39 0.07 3.59 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.77 3.68 0.01 0.16
11 65.03 0.20 65.25 0.20 65.62 0.20 0.23 0.00 0.63 0.36 0.00 0.55 0.59 0.00 0.74
12 32.96 0.11 32.98 0.11 33.83 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.87 0.84 0.00 0.36 0.87 0.00 0.65
13 107.69 0.31 109.07 0.32 111.24 0.32 1.39 0.00 0.24 2.16 0.01 0.14 3.55 0.01 0.17
14 100.36 0.29 102.18 0.29 102.31 0.29 1.82 0.00 0.18 0.13 0.00 0.72 1.95 0.00 0.38
15 77.05 0.23 85.59 0.26 85.59 0.26 8.54 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.93 8.54 0.02 0.01
16 95.99 0.29 98.03 0.29 98.62 0.30 2.04 0.00 0.15 0.59 0.01 0.44 2.63 0.01 0.27
17 64.00 0.21 64.24 0.21 64.91 0.21 0.24 0.00 0.62 0.67 0.00 0.41 0.91 0.00 0.63
18 59.39 0.18 64.78 0.20 65.04 0.20 5.40 0.01 0.02 0.26 0.00 0.61 5.66 0.02 0.06
19 32.18 0.10 32.23 0.10 33.47 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.82 1.24 0.00 0.27 1.29 0.00 0.52
20 31.40 0.10 31.85 0.10 33.21 0.11 0.45 0.00 0.50 1.36 0.01 0.24 1.81 0.01 0.40
21 77.65 0.23 77.72 0.23 78.29 0.23 0.08 0.00 0.78 0.57 0.00 0.45 0.64 0.00 0.72
22 27.57 0.10 31.15 0.11 35.20 0.12 3.58 0.01 0.06 4.05 0.01 0.04 7.63 0.03 0.02
23 70.82 0.21 71.51 0.21 71.94 0.21 0.69 0.00 0.41 0.43 0.00 0.51 1.12 0.00 0.57
24 38.23 0.12 38.36 0.12 41.09 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.72 2.73 0.01 0.10 2.86 0.01 0.24
25 38.37 0.13 38.70 0.13 38.88 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.57 0.18 0.00 0.67 0.51 0.00 0.77
26 60.25 0.19 60.93 0.19 61.91 0.19 0.68 0.00 0.41 0.98 0.00 0.32 1.66 0.00 0.44
27 0.51 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.54 0.01 0.00 0.92 0.38 0.00 0.83
28 46.63 0.14 46.79 0.14 48.27 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.69 1.48 0.00 0.22 1.63 0.00 0.44
29 46.59 0.14 49.85 0.15 50.82 0.15 3.27 0.01 0.07 0.96 0.00 0.33 4.23 0.01 0.12
30 34.90 0.12 34.90 0.12 35.24 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.34 0.00 0.56 0.35 0.00 0.84
31 26.13 0.09 26.73 0.09 30.37 0.10 0.61 0.00 0.44 3.64 0.01 0.06 4.24 0.01 0.12
32 1.27 0.00 2.67 0.01 3.46 0.01 1.39 0.01 0.24 0.79 0.00 0.37 2.18 0.01 0.34
Table 9. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Dialectical Self Scale between East Asian Canadians and South Asian Canadians
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 100.85 0.18 102.41 0.18 102.89 0.18 1.57 0.00 0.21 0.48 0.00 0.49 2.04 0.00 0.36
2 64.28 0.12 64.80 0.12 65.15 0.12 0.52 0.00 0.47 0.36 0.00 0.55 0.88 0.00 0.65
3 1.68 0.00 1.95 0.00 3.32 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.60 1.37 0.00 0.24 1.65 0.00 0.44
4 52.35 0.10 52.35 0.10 53.13 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.78 0.00 0.38 0.78 0.00 0.68
5 145.60 0.26 148.32 0.26 148.45 0.26 2.73 0.00 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.72 2.85 0.00 0.24
6 79.49 0.16 79.62 0.16 80.45 0.16 0.13 0.00 0.72 0.83 0.00 0.36 0.96 0.00 0.62
7 73.05 0.14 73.36 0.14 75.71 0.14 0.31 0.00 0.57 2.35 0.00 0.13 2.66 0.00 0.26
8 113.55 0.21 119.15 0.21 120.00 0.21 5.59 0.01 0.02 0.85 0.00 0.36 6.45 0.01 0.04
9 145.53 0.26 145.71 0.26 146.89 0.26 0.18 0.00 0.67 1.18 0.00 0.28 1.36 0.00 0.51
10 32.79 0.07 40.02 0.08 40.34 0.08 7.23 0.01 0.01 0.33 0.00 0.57 7.56 0.01 0.02
11 98.49 0.18 99.46 0.18 99.48 0.18 0.97 0.00 0.32 0.03 0.00 0.87 1.00 0.00 0.61
12 87.02 0.17 87.16 0.17 91.72 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.70 4.55 0.00 0.03 4.70 0.00 0.10
13 196.40 0.34 197.94 0.34 198.22 0.34 1.54 0.00 0.21 0.28 0.00 0.60 1.82 0.00 0.40
14 191.71 0.32 194.73 0.33 195.30 0.33 3.02 0.00 0.08 0.57 0.00 0.45 3.59 0.01 0.17
15 163.82 0.29 164.44 0.29 165.10 0.29 0.62 0.00 0.43 0.67 0.00 0.41 1.29 0.00 0.53
16 178.57 0.31 179.24 0.31 179.24 0.31 0.67 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.67 0.00 0.72
17 102.81 0.20 102.82 0.20 102.82 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.01 0.00 1.00
18 100.69 0.18 101.51 0.18 101.74 0.19 0.83 0.00 0.36 0.22 0.00 0.64 1.05 0.00 0.59
19 70.09 0.13 71.22 0.13 72.36 0.13 1.13 0.00 0.29 1.14 0.00 0.29 2.27 0.00 0.32
20 32.38 0.07 45.01 0.09 46.94 0.09 12.63 0.02 0.00 1.94 0.01 0.16 14.57 0.03 0.00
21 143.36 0.25 146.22 0.26 148.19 0.26 2.86 0.01 0.09 1.97 0.00 0.16 4.83 0.01 0.09
22 39.49 0.08 43.48 0.09 45.44 0.09 4.00 0.01 0.05 1.96 0.00 0.16 5.95 0.01 0.05
23 124.35 0.22 124.76 0.22 124.80 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.52 0.04 0.00 0.85 0.45 0.00 0.80
24 40.36 0.08 40.94 0.08 45.50 0.09 0.58 0.00 0.45 4.56 0.01 0.03 5.14 0.01 0.08
25 59.65 0.12 63.85 0.12 64.12 0.13 4.21 0.01 0.04 0.27 0.00 0.61 4.47 0.01 0.11
26 100.13 0.19 100.14 0.19 100.15 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.02 0.00 0.99
27 1.31 0.00 1.34 0.00 1.36 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.86 0.03 0.00 0.87 0.06 0.00 0.97
28 54.85 0.10 55.06 0.10 59.26 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.65 4.20 0.01 0.04 4.40 0.01 0.11
29 50.12 0.09 51.23 0.10 52.29 0.10 1.11 0.00 0.29 1.05 0.00 0.31 2.16 0.00 0.34
30 74.73 0.15 77.70 0.16 79.00 0.16 2.97 0.01 0.08 1.30 0.00 0.25 4.27 0.01 0.12
31 49.10 0.10 54.05 0.10 55.34 0.11 4.94 0.01 0.03 1.29 0.00 0.26 6.23 0.01 0.04
32 1.43 0.00 1.46 0.00 2.10 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.88 0.64 0.00 0.42 0.67 0.00 0.72
Table 10. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Dialectical Self Scale between females and males
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 169.58 0.35 176.46 0.36 176.47 0.36 6.88 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.91 6.89 0.01 0.03
2 200.23 0.41 205.41 0.42 205.49 0.42 5.18 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.78 5.26 0.01 0.07
3 238.72 0.47 241.14 0.47 250.75 0.49 2.42 0.00 0.12 9.61 0.02 0.00 12.03 0.02 0.00
4 271.43 0.52 275.23 0.53 276.97 0.54 3.80 0.01 0.05 1.74 0.00 0.19 5.54 0.01 0.06
5 312.48 0.57 312.73 0.57 312.73 0.57 0.24 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.25 0.00 0.88
6 275.26 0.53 288.96 0.55 289.03 0.55 13.70 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.78 13.77 0.02 0.00
7 199.30 0.43 200.26 0.43 200.53 0.43 0.96 0.00 0.33 0.26 0.00 0.61 1.22 0.00 0.54
8 148.14 0.33 148.25 0.33 148.62 0.33 0.11 0.00 0.74 0.37 0.00 0.54 0.48 0.00 0.79
9 132.39 0.30 133.83 0.30 134.09 0.30 1.44 0.00 0.23 0.26 0.00 0.61 1.70 0.00 0.43
10 157.75 0.34 159.58 0.34 161.18 0.34 1.83 0.00 0.18 1.60 0.00 0.21 3.42 0.01 0.18
11 95.88 0.24 108.28 0.26 110.23 0.27 12.39 0.02 0.00 1.95 0.01 0.16 14.35 0.03 0.00
12 130.44 0.30 130.48 0.30 130.51 0.30 0.05 0.00 0.83 0.02 0.00 0.88 0.07 0.00 0.97
13 117.86 0.26 120.08 0.27 123.47 0.28 2.21 0.01 0.14 3.39 0.01 0.07 5.61 0.01 0.06
14 150.58 0.33 151.24 0.33 151.63 0.33 0.66 0.00 0.42 0.38 0.00 0.54 1.04 0.00 0.59
15 177.11 0.38 178.94 0.38 179.02 0.38 1.83 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.00 0.79 1.90 0.00 0.39
Table 11. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Indecisiveness Scale between European Canadians and East Asian Canadians
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 112.68 0.33 112.86 0.33 112.87 0.33 0.18 0.00 0.67 0.01 0.00 0.93 0.18 0.00 0.91
2 161.33 0.44 162.56 0.44 162.64 0.44 1.24 0.00 0.27 0.08 0.00 0.78 1.32 0.00 0.52
3 240.88 0.59 243.81 0.59 243.82 0.59 2.93 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.96 2.94 0.00 0.23
4 212.66 0.54 214.23 0.54 215.54 0.55 1.57 0.00 0.21 1.30 0.01 0.25 2.87 0.01 0.24
5 235.20 0.59 235.39 0.59 235.40 0.59 0.20 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.20 0.00 0.90
6 224.74 0.57 228.14 0.58 228.29 0.58 3.41 0.01 0.06 0.15 0.00 0.70 3.56 0.01 0.17
7 112.91 0.35 113.18 0.35 118.17 0.36 0.27 0.00 0.61 4.99 0.01 0.03 5.26 0.02 0.07
8 108.74 0.34 110.43 0.34 112.52 0.34 1.69 0.00 0.19 2.09 0.01 0.15 3.78 0.01 0.15
9 99.04 0.30 102.61 0.31 104.50 0.31 3.57 0.01 0.06 1.89 0.01 0.17 5.46 0.02 0.07
10 92.78 0.28 93.23 0.28 93.42 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.19 0.00 0.67 0.64 0.00 0.73
11 85.84 0.29 103.02 0.34 103.15 0.34 17.18 0.05 < .01 0.13 0.00 0.72 17.31 0.05 < .01
12 92.88 0.29 93.63 0.30 94.00 0.30 0.75 0.00 0.39 0.36 0.00 0.55 1.11 0.01 0.57
13 72.00 0.23 77.59 0.24 78.14 0.25 5.59 0.02 0.02 0.55 0.00 0.46 6.14 0.02 0.05
14 104.87 0.32 108.72 0.33 109.16 0.33 3.85 0.01 0.05 0.45 0.00 0.50 4.30 0.01 0.12
15 131.07 0.38 131.30 0.38 133.40 0.39 0.23 0.00 0.63 2.10 0.01 0.15 2.32 0.01 0.31
Table 12. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Indecisiveness Scale between European Canadians and South Asian Canadians
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 123.59 0.35 130.58 0.37 130.63 0.37 6.99 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.81 7.05 0.02 0.03
2 134.02 0.38 143.89 0.41 144.12 0.41 9.87 0.02 < .01 0.23 0.00 0.64 10.10 0.02 0.01
3 159.56 0.44 159.67 0.44 166.33 0.45 0.11 0.00 0.74 6.66 0.02 0.01 6.77 0.02 0.03
4 193.68 0.51 193.70 0.51 193.71 0.51 0.02 0.00 0.88 0.01 0.00 0.94 0.03 0.00 0.99
5 214.54 0.54 215.29 0.55 215.31 0.55 0.75 0.00 0.39 0.03 0.00 0.87 0.77 0.00 0.68
6 195.33 0.51 196.73 0.51 196.74 0.51 1.40 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.90 1.41 0.00 0.49
7 118.84 0.37 119.17 0.37 125.67 0.38 0.33 0.00 0.57 6.50 0.02 0.01 6.83 0.02 0.03
8 90.30 0.28 93.79 0.28 94.74 0.29 3.48 0.01 0.06 0.95 0.00 0.33 4.43 0.01 0.11
9 105.95 0.32 106.54 0.32 107.43 0.32 0.58 0.00 0.45 0.89 0.00 0.35 1.47 0.00 0.48
10 126.34 0.36 126.37 0.36 126.86 0.36 0.03 0.00 0.86 0.50 0.00 0.48 0.53 0.00 0.77
11 54.42 0.18 55.55 0.18 57.77 0.19 1.13 0.00 0.29 2.22 0.01 0.14 3.35 0.01 0.19
12 97.30 0.29 98.04 0.29 98.40 0.29 0.74 0.00 0.39 0.36 0.00 0.55 1.09 0.00 0.58
13 103.51 0.30 104.46 0.30 104.99 0.30 0.95 0.00 0.33 0.53 0.00 0.47 1.48 0.00 0.48
14 90.53 0.28 92.09 0.28 92.13 0.28 1.57 0.00 0.21 0.04 0.00 0.85 1.60 0.00 0.45
15 109.71 0.32 111.55 0.32 113.72 0.33 1.84 0.00 0.18 2.18 0.01 0.14 4.01 0.01 0.13
Table 13. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Indecisiveness Scale between East Asian Canadians and South Asian Canadians
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 207.43 0.35 207.47 0.35 207.51 0.35 0.05 0.00 0.82 0.03 0.00 0.86 0.08 0.00 0.96
2 245.45 0.41 245.65 0.41 245.65 0.41 0.21 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.00 0.90
3 318.33 0.50 321.59 0.50 322.16 0.50 3.26 0.00 0.07 0.57 0.00 0.45 3.83 0.00 0.15
4 339.25 0.52 341.63 0.53 343.46 0.53 2.38 0.00 0.12 1.83 0.00 0.18 4.21 0.01 0.12
5 383.32 0.57 383.39 0.57 383.39 0.57 0.07 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.07 0.00 0.96
6 343.04 0.53 349.48 0.54 349.55 0.54 6.44 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.79 6.51 0.01 0.04
7 217.95 0.39 218.48 0.39 221.73 0.40 0.53 0.00 0.47 3.26 0.01 0.07 3.78 0.01 0.15
8 175.42 0.32 176.54 0.32 178.49 0.32 1.12 0.00 0.29 1.95 0.00 0.16 3.06 0.00 0.22
9 168.33 0.30 172.41 0.31 174.31 0.31 4.09 0.01 0.04 1.89 0.00 0.17 5.98 0.01 0.05
10 189.53 0.33 190.46 0.33 191.10 0.33 0.93 0.00 0.34 0.64 0.00 0.42 1.57 0.00 0.46
11 120.94 0.24 139.74 0.27 139.75 0.27 18.80 0.03 < .01 0.01 0.00 0.94 18.81 0.03 < .01
12 162.08 0.30 162.77 0.30 163.13 0.30 0.69 0.00 0.41 0.36 0.00 0.55 1.05 0.00 0.59
13 145.39 0.26 151.45 0.27 152.84 0.27 6.06 0.01 0.01 1.40 0.00 0.24 7.45 0.01 0.02
14 175.66 0.32 179.58 0.32 180.21 0.32 3.92 0.00 0.05 0.63 0.00 0.43 4.55 0.01 0.10
15 208.27 0.36 208.28 0.36 209.62 0.36 0.01 0.00 0.93 1.34 0.00 0.25 1.35 0.00 0.51
Table 14. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Indecisiveness Scale between females and males
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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Conclusions. Through statistical analyses of item response data, we did not find 
any evidence to suggest that any item of any one of the three scales functions 
differentially across any two of the three cultural groups or the two gender groups. As a 
result, group means in need for cognition, naïve dialecticism, and indecisiveness can be 
meaningfully compared.  
Group Differences in Naïve Dialecticism 
First, I examined H1 that East Asian Canadians would be more dialectical, 
compared with European Canadians and South Asian Canadians. I also included gender 
as an independent variable in this and subsequent analyses to 1) explore potential gender 
differences and 2) to see whether cultural differences were confounded by gender 
differences as gender proportion differed among the three cultural groups. I conducted a 
3 (culture: European Canadian vs. East Asian Canadian vs. South Asian Canadian) 2 
(gender: male vs. female) between-subjects ANCOVA on naïve dialecticism with age as 
the covariate. Age was a significant covariate, such that younger participants exhibited 
higher levels of naïve dialecticism, F(1, 488) = 6.64, p =. 01, 
p
2  = .01. More 
importantly, the predicted main effect of culture emerged, F(2, 488) = 10.21, p < . 001, 

p
2  = .04. Post hoc analyses with p-values adjusted using Bonferroni correction revealed 
that East Asian Canadian participants exhibited higher levels of dialectical thinking than 
did European Canadian, F(1, 394) = 20.86, p < . 001, 
p
2  = .05, and South Asian 
Canadian participants, F(1, 290) = 6.46, p = .04, 
p
2  = .02, while the latter two groups 
did not differ from each other, F(1, 291) = 2.96, p = .26, 
p
2  = .01 (see Table 2 for Ms 
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and SDs), supporting H1. No other effects reached statistical significance, Fs < 3.57, ps 
> .05. 
Group Differences in Indecisiveness 
Second, I examined H2 that East Asian Canadians would be more indecisive, 
compared with European Canadians and South Asian Canadians. We conducted a 3 
(culture: European Canadian vs. East Asian Canadian vs. South Asian Canadian) 2 
(gender: male vs. female) between-subjects ANCOVA on indecisiveness with age as the 
covariate. Age was a significant covariate, such that younger participants exhibited 
higher levels of indecisiveness, F(1, 488) = 4.26, p =. 04, 
p
2  = .0114. More importantly, 
the predicted main effect of culture emerged, F(2, 488) = 7.27, p =. 001, 
p
2  = .04. Post 
hoc analyses with p-values adjusted using Bonferroni correction revealed that East Asian 
Canadian participants exhibited higher levels of indecisiveness than did European 
Canadian, F(1, 394) = 12.58, p = .001, 
p
2  = .03, and South Asian Canadian participants, 
F(1, 290) = 7.86, p = .02, 
p
2  = .03, while the latter two groups did not differ from each 
other, F(1, 291) = 0.11, p > .99, 
p
2  < .01 (see Table 2 for Ms and SDs), supporting H2. 
No other effects reached statistical significance, Fs < 0.57, ps > .56. 
Group Differences in Need for Cognition 
Third, I explored whether need for cognition varied across the present three 
cultural groups as need for cognition is known to negatively covary with indecisiveness 
                                                 
14 This finding should be interpreted with caution because the variability of age is severely restricted and 
the distribution of age was positively skewed. 
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(Curşeu, 2006). I conducted a 3 (culture: European Canadian vs. East Asian Canadian 
vs. South Asian Canadian) 2 (gender: male vs. female) between-subjects ANCOVA on 
need for cognition with age as the covariate. Age was a significant covariate, such that 
older participants exhibited higher levels of need for cognition, F(1, 489) = 11.91, p =. 
001, 
p
2  = .02.15 In addition, there was a main effect of gender, F(1, 489) = 5.51, p =. 
019, 
p
2  = .01, such that male participants (M = 3.19, SD = 0.54) exhibited higher levels 
of need for cognition than did female participants (M = 3.10, SD = 0.57). Finally, there 
was also a main effect of culture, F(2, 489) = 8.02, p <. 001, 
p
2  = .03. Post hoc analyses 
with p-values adjusted using Bonferroni correction revealed that East Asian Canadian 
participants exhibited lower levels of need for cognition than did European Canadian, 
F(1, 395) = 12.39, p = .001, 
p
2  = .03, and South Asian Canadian participants, F(1, 291) 
= 9.87, p = .01, 
p
2  = .03, while the latter two groups did not differ from each other, F(1, 
291) = 0.01, p > .99, 
p
2  < .01 (see Table 2 for Ms and SDs). The interaction effect was 
not significant, F(2, 489) = 1.41, p = .24, 
p
2  < .01. 
Mediational Analyses 
As East Asian Canadians were more dialectical, had less need for cognition, and 
were more indecisive, compared with both European Canadians and South Asian 
Canadians, I performed mediational analyses to test whether naïve dialecticism and need 
for cognition could explain this cultural difference in indecisiveness (see Table 15 for  
  
                                                 
15 This finding should be interpreted with caution because the variability of age was severely restricted and 
the distribution of age was positively skewed. 
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Table 15. Correlations among Variables in Study 2 
  Need for Cognition Naïve Dialecticism 
 East Asian Canadians 
Naïve Dialecticism -.15*  
Indecisiveness -.29** .37** 
 European Canadians 
Naïve Dialecticism -.21**  
Indecisiveness -.36** .47** 
 South Asian Canadians 
Naïve Dialecticism -.14  
Indecisiveness -.12 .57** 
Note: *p < .05 (two-tailed); **p < .01 (two-tailed) 
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correlations among variables). A multiple mediation model was tested using a 
bootstrapping technique with 5000 resamples with age and gender as the covariates, 
culture (East Asian Canadian vs. European Canadian and South Asian Canadian) as the 
independent variable, naïve dialecticism and need for cognition as the mediators, and 
indecisiveness as the dependent variable (see Figure 1). Both mediators were significant 
predictors of indecisiveness (naïve dialecticism: t(489) = 10.60, p < .001; need for 
cognition: t(489) = -5.78, p < .001), albeit influencing indecisiveness in opposite 
directions. Importantly, the indirect effects of culture on indecisiveness, mediated 
through the effect of each of the two mediators, were significant (naïve dialecticism: 
point estimate = .11; 95% biased-corrected confidence interval of .06 to .16, supporting 
H3; need for cognition: point estimate = .05, 95% biased-corrected confidence interval 
of .02 to .09).  
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Figure 1. The Multiple Mediation Model of the Relationship between Culture and 
Indecisiveness in Study 2 
Note: EC = European Canadians; SAC = South Asian Canadians; EAC = East Asian 
Canadians; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Age and gender were used as covariates (not shown in the figure). 
Age: b = -.002, SE = .01, t(489) = -.19, p = .85; Gender (male = 0, female = 1): b = .08, 
SE = .05, t(489) = 1.42, p = .16 
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Discussion 
In the present study chronic indecisiveness was shown to vary as a function of 
culture. Moreover, indecisiveness was related to the culturally-encouraged worldview of 
East Asians, that of naïve dialecticism. As hypothesized, East Asian Canadians endorsed 
a dialectical worldview to a greater extent than members of the other groups and showed 
a higher degree of chronic indecisiveness, with naïve dialecticism partially accounting 
for these cultural differences in chronic indecisiveness. Although not hypothesized, it 
was also found that, compared to European Canadians and South Asian Canadians, East 
Asian Canadians were lower in need for cognition and this also mediated the 
relationship between culture and indecisiveness. Speculations about why individuals of 
East Asian cultural backgrounds tend to have a relatively low need for cognition are 
offered in the General Discussion.  
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Chapter 4 
Study 3 
The goal of Study 3 was to replicate and extend the findings of Study 2. 
Specifically, I tested again the mediating role that naïve dialecticism plays in explaining 
cultural differences in chronic indecisiveness and examined how these differences might 
have negative downstream consequences for life satisfaction. This study was conducted 
at York University in Toronto, comparing participants of East Asian and European 
cultural backgrounds. The study tested the following hypotheses: (H1) East Asian 
Canadians will exhibit more naïve dialecticism than European Canadians; (H2) East 
Asian Canadians will exhibit more chronic indecisiveness than European Canadians; 
(H3) East Asian Canadians will be less satisfied with their lives, compared with 
European Canadians; and (H4) naïve dialecticism and indecisiveness will statistically 
explain cultural differences in life satisfaction.  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and four students at York University in Toronto, including 44 East 
Asian Canadians (16 female, 28 male) and 60 European Canadians (42 female, 18 male), 
completed this study online. The gender proportion differed between the two cultural 
groups, 2 (1, N = 104) = 11.64, p < .01. Age did not differ between the two cultural 
groups (East Asian Canadians: M = 19.3, SD = 1.90; European Canadians: M = 20.1, SD 
= 3.14), t(100) = -1.44, p = .15, d = 0.30.16 For the 44 self-identified East Asian 
                                                 
16 One East Asian Canadian participant and one European Canadian participant did not report their age. 
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Canadian participants, three were born in China and 41 were born in Canada. For the 60 
self-identified European Canadian participants, 50 were born in Canada and nine were 
born in the United States or a European country (e.g., Ukraine).17 
Measures 
Naïve dialecticism. As in Study 2, the 32-item Dialectical Self Scale (DSS; 
Spencer-Rodgers, Srivastava, & Peng, 2011) was used to measure naïve dialecticism, 
using a 7-point response scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  
Chronic indecisiveness. As in Study 2, chronic indecisiveness was assessed 
using the 15-item Indecisiveness Scale (IS; Frost & Shows, 1993), using a 5-point 
response scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  
Life satisfaction. The 5-item Satisfaction with Life Scale (SLS; Diener, 
Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; see Appendix D) was used to measure life 
satisfaction. The SLS uses a 7-point response scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). Sample items include: “I am satisfied with my life” and “If I could live my life 
over, I would change almost nothing.”  
Procedure 
After indicating consent, participants first answered some demographic questions 
(e.g., gender, age, ethnicity) and then completed the following measures in this order: 
DSS, IS, and SLS. All materials were presented in English. At the end of the study, 
participants were thanked and fully debriefed.  
 
                                                 
17 One European Canadian participant did not report his or her country of birth. 
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Results 
Differential Item Functioning Analyses of the Satisfaction with Life Scale 
As in Study 2, DIF analyses were performed using an SPSS Macro (Zumbo, 
1999). Focusing on total DIF (Model 1 vs. Model 3), no item functioned differentially 
across cultural groups. None of the likelihood ratio 2 statistics were statistically 
significant, ps > .16, pseudo-R2s < .02 (see Table 16). Moreover, no item functioned 
differentially across gender groups; all likelihood ratio 2 statistics were nonsignificant, 
ps > .05, pseudo-R2s < .03 (see Table 17). 
Group Differences in Naïve Dialecticism 
Two-way ANOVAs with culture (East Asian vs. European) and gender (male vs. 
female) as the independent variables and naïve dialecticism as the dependent variable 
revealed the following findings. First, replicating Study 2 and in support of H1, the main 
effect of culture was significant, with East Asian Canadians (M = 4.03, SD = 0.49,  
= .77) reporting higher levels of naïve dialecticism than European Canadians (M = 3.70, 
SD = 0.42,  = .72), F(1, 100) = 7.84, p < .01, 
p
2  = .07. Second, the main effect of 
gender was significant, with male participants (M = 4.01, SD = 0.46) reporting higher 
levels of naïve dialecticism, relative to female participants (M = 3.71, SD = 0.46), F(1, 
100) = 5.46, p = .02, 
p
2  = .05. Third, the interaction effect of culture and gender was not 
significant, F(1, 100) < 0.01, p = .97, 
p
2  < .001. 
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 107.70 0.68 107.70 0.68 107.86 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.16 0.00 0.69 0.16 0.00 0.92
2 98.73 0.68 98.80 0.68 99.17 0.68 0.07 0.00 0.79 0.37 0.00 0.54 0.44 0.00 0.80
3 160.55 0.84 160.61 0.84 160.64 0.84 0.06 0.00 0.81 0.03 0.00 0.87 0.09 0.00 0.96
4 113.47 0.70 113.53 0.70 115.42 0.71 0.05 0.00 0.82 1.89 0.01 0.17 1.95 0.01 0.38
5 86.09 0.59 86.71 0.60 86.73 0.60 0.62 0.00 0.43 0.02 0.00 0.88 0.64 0.01 0.73
Table 16. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Satisfaction with Life Scale between European Canadians and East Asian Canadians
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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item 2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p 2 pseudo-R
2 
p
1 107.70 0.68 108.43 0.68 109.00 0.69 0.73 0.00 0.39 0.57 0.00 0.45 1.30 0.01 0.52
2 98.73 0.68 101.82 0.69 104.66 0.70 3.09 0.01 0.08 2.85 0.01 0.09 5.94 0.02 0.05
3 160.55 0.84 160.81 0.84 161.83 0.84 0.26 0.00 0.61 1.02 0.00 0.31 1.28 0.00 0.53
4 113.47 0.70 113.90 0.70 117.17 0.71 0.43 0.00 0.51 3.28 0.01 0.07 3.70 0.01 0.16
5 86.09 0.59 88.02 0.60 88.06 0.60 1.93 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.84 1.97 0.01 0.37
Table 17. Differential Item Functioning Analyses of Satisfaction with Life Scale between Females and Males
M2 vs. M3 (df = 1) M1 vs. M3 (df = 2)Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) Model 3 (M3) M1 vs. M2 (df = 1)
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Group Differences in Chronic Indecisiveness 
Two-way ANOVAs with culture (East Asian vs. European) and gender (male vs. 
female) as the independent variables and chronic indecisiveness as the dependent 
variable revealed the following results. First, as expected and replicating Study 2, the 
main effect of culture was significant, with East Asian Canadians (M = 3.19, SD = 0.50, 
 = .77) reporting higher levels of chronic indecisiveness than European Canadians (M = 
2.79, SD = 0.66,  = .88), F(1, 100) = 9.79, p < .01, 
p
2  = .09, supporting H2. Second, 
the main effect of gender was not significant (male participants: M = 3.03, SD = 0.62; 
female participants: M = 2.90, SD = 0.63), F(1, 100) < 0.01, p = .95, 
p
2  < .001. Third, 
the interaction of culture and gender was not significant, F(1, 100) = 0.09, p = .78, 
p
2  
= .001.  
Group Differences in Life Satisfaction  
A two-way ANOVA with culture (East Asian vs. European) and gender (male 
vs. female) as the independent variables and life satisfaction as the dependent variable 
revealed the following findings. Supporting H4, the main effect of culture was 
significant. East Asian Canadians (M = 4.01, SD = 1.13,  = .82) reported lower levels 
of life satisfaction than did European Canadians (M = 5.02, SD = 1.07,  = .83), F(1, 
100) = 14.82, p < .001, 
p
2  = .13. The main effect of gender was not significant (male 
participants: M = 4.23, SD = 1.28; female participants: M = 4.88, SD = 1.05), F(1, 100) 
= 1.86, p = .18, 
p
2  = .02. The interaction of culture and gender was not significant, F(1, 
100) = 2.12, p = .15, 
p
2  = .02.  
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The Mediating Roles of Naïve Dialecticism and Chronic Indecisiveness on the 
Relationship between Culture and Life Satisfaction 
To examine our hypothesized mediation model that culture would exert an 
influence on life satisfaction through the effect of naïve dialecticism and chronic 
indecisiveness in succession (i.e., culture  naïve dialecticism  chronic indecisiveness 
 life satisfaction), we used a bootstrapping technique with 10,000 resamples (Hayes, 
2013) (see Table 18 for correlations among variables). Results indicated that the serial 
multiple mediation model was significant at the level of p < .01, point estimate = -.09, 
99% biased-corrected confidence interval of -.31 to -.01, supporting H4 (see Figure 2).18  
   Discussion 
Replicating the previous study, the current findings indicate that, relative to 
European culture, East Asian culture promotes a higher level of dialectical thinking 
tendency, which in turn contributes to more chronic indecisiveness. Extending the 
previous study, the present results also show that chronic indecisiveness induced by a 
dialectical worldview leads to reduced life satisfaction. While previous studies have 
shown that individuals of East Asian (vs. European) cultural backgrounds or dialectical 
(vs. non-dialectical) thinkers tend to report lower life satisfaction (e.g., Diener et al., 
1995; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004), the current study is the first to show that chronic 
indecisiveness could contribute to these cross-cultural and individual differences. The 
  
                                                 
18 As there was no effect involving gender on life satisfaction and gender was not my research focus, I did 
not include gender in the mediation model. In another model, I added gender as a covariate and found that 
the serial multiple mediation model remained significant at the level of p < .01, point estimate = -.08, 99% 
biased-corrected confidence interval = -.28 to -.01. 
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Table 18. Correlations among Variables in Study 3 
  Naïve Dialecticism Indecisiveness 
 East Asian Canadians 
Indecisiveness  .31*  
Satisfaction with Life -.24 -.49** 
 European Canadians 
Indecisiveness  .35**  
Satisfaction with Life -.55** -.42** 
Note: *p < .05 (two-tailed); **p < .01 (two-tailed) 
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Figure 2. The Serial Multiple Mediation Model of the Relationship between Culture and Life Satisfaction in Study 3 
Note: EC = European Canadians; EAC = East Asian Canadians; *p < .05; **p < .01; **p < .001 
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present finding is consistent to my proposition that if individuals have a chronic 
tendency to doubt whether they have made the right decision across domains, then they 
would be less satisfied with their lives. 
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Chapter 5 
Study 4 
I have demonstrated in Studies 2 and 3 that naïve dialecticism is positively 
correlated with chronic indecisiveness. The goal of Study 4 was to establish the causal 
effect of naïve dialecticism on indecision and to test a mediating mechanism that might 
explain this effect in a consumer choice task. Following recent experimental cultural 
psychology work (Oyserman & Lee, 2008), a priming method was used in the present 
study to test the causal effect of naïve dialecticism on indecision. The dialectical mindset 
prime used in the present study was adapted from Spencer-Rodgers and colleagues 
(2004) who demonstrated with this prime that participants with an induced dialectical 
mindset (vs. controls) scored lower on a self-esteem measure. In the present study I 
expected that participants who were primed with a dialectical mindset would exhibit 
higher levels of indecision and were more likely to defer their choice, compared to those 
who were not primed with such a mindset. 
As reviewed previously, dialectical (vs. non-dialectical) thinkers have a higher 
tendency to evaluate objects as simultaneously positive and negative (e.g., Spencer-
Rodgers et al., 2004). This evaluative ambivalence might create tension when one needs 
to decide whether to choose an object or not (see van Harreveld et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, I expected that the effect of naïve dialecticism on indecision and choice 
deferral would be explained by evaluative ambivalence.  
Previous research suggests that the effect of culture on choice related 
consequences (e.g., post-choice cognitive dissonance reduction) might be moderated by 
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the target for whom the individual is making the choice. Whereas individualistic 
European Americans, but not East Asians, would demonstrate post-choice justification 
(i.e., evaluating the chosen object more positive and/or evaluating the unchosen object 
less positive after making the choice) when choosing for oneself (Heine & Lehman, 
1997), collectivistic East Asians (vs. European Canadians) would show more post-
choice spread of alternatives when choosing an object for a close friend (Hoshino-
Browne, Zanna, Spencer, Zanna, Kitayama, & Lackenbauer, 2005). Thus, it is important 
to examine whether the effect of naïve dialecticism on indecision would generalize 
across decisions made for the self and decisions made for another person.  
Method 
Participants 
In this study I recruited participants of the same cultural background to control 
for potential confounding variables while isolating the causal effect of naïve dialecticism 
on indecision. One hundred and nine European Canadian undergraduates (84 female, 25 
male; Mage = 20.6 years, SDage = 5.90) at York University in Toronto, completed the 
present study online for course credit19.  
Measures and Procedure 
After indicating consent, participants first answered some demographic questions 
(e.g., gender, age, academic major). They were then randomly assigned to either the 
dialectical prime condition (n = 51) or the no-prime control condition (n = 58). 
Following Spencer-Rodgers and colleagues (2004), participants in the dialectical prime 
                                                 
19 Four participants did not provide their age. 
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condition were told to describe in writing a time in their lives that was full of 
contradictions and uncertainty (see Appendix E). Participants in the no-prime control 
condition did not complete this exercise. Participants then completed the DSS (see Study 
2) assessing dialectical thinking tendency ( = .82), as a manipulation check.  
After completing the DSS, participants were randomly assigned to either the self 
condition (n = 54) or the other condition (n = 55), and completed a consumer choice 
task. In this task, participants first read the descriptions of four models of laptop 
computers, shown on the same page, and were told to imagine that they needed to 
choose one to buy for themselves (self condition) or to recommend to their boss (other 
condition). The four laptop models varied in terms of attractiveness of four attributes 
(i.e., processor speed, hard drive capacity, RAM size, weight) but overall (assuming 
equal weights of the attributes) they are equally attractive (see Figure 3). Specifically, 
each alternative had a superior attribute and an inferior attribute compared to the other 
three alternatives. Participants were also told that these models were in an acceptable 
price range for themselves (or their boss), so price was not a concern. After reading the 
information about the four models, participants were shown the information about each 
model again on separate pages and were asked to indicate, for each model, their overall 
evaluations (“How favorable/unfavorable is your evaluation of Model X”; -5 = 
extremely unfavorable, +5 = extremely favorable), positive attitude (“Just thinking about 
the positive aspects of Model X while ignoring the negative aspects of Model X, how 
good is Model X”; 0 = not good at all, 3 = very good), and negative attitude (“Just 
thinking about the negative aspects of Model X while ignoring  
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Figure 3. The descriptions of the four models of laptop computers in Study 4 
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the positive aspects of Model X, how bad is Model X”; 0 = not bad at all, 3 = very bad).  
Following this, participants were asked, “Are you ready to make a decision at this 
time?” (choice deferral; 0 = “No, I prefer not to make a decision now”; 1 = “Yes, I’m 
ready to make a decision now”) Participants were then shown the descriptions of the 
four models on the same page one more time and asked to choose one model to buy (or 
recommend) even if they preferred to make a decision later. 
After completing the consumer choice task, participants were asked to indicate 
their levels of indecision using three items adapted from the IS (“I find it difficult to 
decide which laptop computer to buy (or recommend)”; “I feel confident that my choice 
is a good one”, reverse scored; “I worry about making the wrong choice”; 1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree; = .84). At the end of the study, participants were thanked 
and fully debriefed.  
Results 
Manipulation Check 
I first tested the intended effect of our manipulation of dialectical mindset and 
found that participants in the dialectical prime condition (M = 3.87, SD = 0.55) reported 
higher levels of dialectical thinking tendency, as measured by the DSS, than did those in 
the no-prime control condition (M = 3.60, SD = 0.50), t(107) = 2.72, p < .01, d = 0.51, 
indicating that our manipulation was successful.  
The Effect of Dialectical Prime on Indecision 
A 2 (prime condition: dialectical prime vs. no-prime control) × 2 (target: self vs. 
other) between-subjects ANOVA on indecision revealed two main effects. As 
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anticipated, participants in the dialectical prime condition (M = 4.61, SD = 1.58) 
exhibited more indecision, compared with those in the no-prime control condition (M = 
3.56, SD = 1.39), F(1, 105) = 13.98, p < .001, 
p
2  = .12. Furthermore, participants in the 
other condition (M = 4.33, SD = 1.56) experienced more indecision, compared with 
those in the self condition (M = 3.77, SD = 1.54), F(1, 105) = 3.78, p = .05, 
p
2  = .04, 
suggesting that choosing for someone else was more difficult than choosing for oneself, 
probably because of the uncertainty about what the other person wanted or needed. 
Importantly, the interaction effect was not statistically significant, F(1, 105) = 0.30, p 
= .59, 
p
2  < .01, suggesting that the effect of dialectical prime on indecision did not vary 
as a function of whether one is choosing for oneself or another person (see Figure 4). 
Hence, for the mediational analyses that follow, I collapsed across target conditions. 
The Effect of Dialectical Prime on Choice Deferral 
 It was expected that being induced a dialectical mindset would increase the 
probability of deferring choice. For participants who chose for themselves (i.e., self 
condition; n = 34),20 those who were primed with a dialectical mindset (24%) were 
nominally more likely to defer their choice, compared with controls (12%). Likewise, 
for participants who chose for their boss (i.e., other condition; n = 44),21 those who were 
primed with a dialectical mindset (27%) were nominally more likely to defer their  
 
                                                 
20 Twenty participants in the self condition skipped the choice deferral question. 
21 Eleven participants in the other condition skipped the choice deferral question. 
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Figure 4. Indecision as a function of prime condition and target in Study 4. Error bars 
indicate standard errors. 
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choice, compared with controls (14%).22  Collapsing across target conditions (n = 78), 
those who were primed with a dialectical mindset (26%) were nominally more likely to 
defer their choice, compared with controls (13%), 2(1) = 2.06, p = .15. 
The Mediating Role of Evaluative Ambivalence 
There are a few different formulae to compute ambivalence (see Breckler, 1994; 
Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995 for review and Riketta, 2000, for an examination of 
discriminative power of different formulae). Among all formulae, the Griffin formula is 
the one which is the most widely employed, and one that reflects a similarity-intensity 
view of ambivalence. That is, ambivalence is conceptualized as a joint function of (a) 
the similarity between the two attitude components and (b) the average intensity of the 
two attitude components. That means that when similarity is held constant, the greater 
the intensity of the two components the greater the ambivalence. Likewise, when 
intensity is held constant, the greater the similarity of the two components, the greater 
the ambivalence.  
I first computed an ambivalence score for each of the four alternatives using the 
Griffin formula (Thompson et al., 1995), where ambivalence = (positive + negative)/2 – 
|positive – negative|, and then added 1.5 to all ambivalence scores for ease of 
interpretation (0 = minimal ambivalence, 4.5 = maximal ambivalence). I then isolated 
the ambivalence score for the laptop model that was eventually chosen by the participant 
(ambivalence toward chosen alternative) because this variable should be more directly 
                                                 
22 For both target conditions, two cells had expected count less than 5.   
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related to our indecision measure (e.g., “I feel confident that my choice is a good one”, 
reverse scored). 
A mediation model was tested using a bootstrapping technique with 10,000 
resamples (Hayes, 2013) with prime condition as the independent variable, ambivalence 
toward chosen alternative as the mediator, and indecision as the dependent variable.23  
First, participants in the dialectical prime condition exhibited more ambivalence toward 
the chosen alternative (M = 2.27, SD = 1.09) than those in the control condition (M = 
1.85, SD = 1.06), t(104) = 1.99, p = .0495, d = 0.78. Second, ambivalence toward the 
chosen alternative predicted higher level of indecision, t(103) = 2.10, p = .04.24 Finally, 
the indirect effect of dialectical prime on indecision, mediated through the effect of 
ambivalence toward chosen alternative, was significant at the level of p < .05, point 
estimate = .11, 95% biased-corrected confidence interval = .002 to .354, Kappa-squared 
= .04 (95% biased-corrected confidence interval = .003 to .115) (see Figure 5). 
I also tested the possibility that naïve dialecticism might induce a more moderate 
(less extreme) overall evaluation of the chosen alternative, which could potentially 
explain the higher level of indecision among dialectically primed participants, relative to 
controls. This, however, was not supported by the current data; there was no difference 
in overall evaluation of the chosen alternative between the two prime conditions  
                                                 
23 Three cases were excluded because they were multivariate outliers, Cook’s Ds > 4/n (Bollen & 
Jackman, 1990). If these three cases were included, the mediation model did not reach conventional level 
of statistical significance, point estimate = .071, 95% biased-corrected confidence interval = -.020 to .294, 
Kappa-squared = .024 (95% biased-corrected confidence interval = .001 to .093). 
24 Ambivalence toward chosen alternative was correlated with the three markers of indecision separately 
(with decision difficulty, r = .25, p < .01; with decision worry, r = .22, p = .02; with decision confidence, r 
= -.18, p = .07). 
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Figure 5. The Mediation Model of the Relationship between Naïve Dialecticism and 
Indecision in Study 4 
Note: *p < .05 
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(dialectical prime: M = 2.27, SD = 2.24; no-prime control: M = 2.09, SD = 2.35), F(1, 
107) = 0.18, p = .67, 
p
2  < .01.  
A related possibility was also tested, namely that naïve dialecticism might make 
the overall evaluations of the alternatives closer to each other (i.e., the alternatives 
appeared more similarly attractive), which could potentially explain the higher level of 
indecision among dialectically primed participants, relative to controls. For each 
participant, evaluative closeness was indexed by the reciprocal of the variance of the 
overall evaluations of the four alternatives. This variable was then compared between 
the two conditions. Results indicated that naïve dialecticism did not have an effect on 
evaluative closeness (dialectical prime: M = 0.18, SD = 0.18; no-prime control: M = 
0.20, SD = 0.18), F(1, 107) = 0.10, p = .75, 
p
2  < .01.   
Discussion 
In sum, consistent with the correlational results obtained in the previous two 
studies, I demonstrated in the present study that naïve dialecticism had a causal effect on 
indecision in a consumer choice task, conceptually replicating a recent study (Study 2, 
Li, Russell, & Masuda, 2014) which found that participants who were primed with the 
idea that components of the world are interconnected (vs. distinct and separate from 
each other) took a longer time to make a choice. Compared with the study of Li and 
colleagues (2014), the present study used a different manipulation of naïve dialecticism 
and a different measure of indecision, and extended their study by showing that 
indecision induced by dialectical thinking generalized across decisions made for the self 
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and decisions made for another person.25 Moreover, naïve dialecticism seemed to have 
some influence on choice deferral tendency, albeit the statistical test fell short of 
statistical significance. It may be the case that this effect is relatively weak and thus the 
current sample size was not large enough to detect it. It would be informative to employ 
a larger sample to re-examine this possibility. Finally, I also tested and found support for 
the proposed mechanism underlying the effect of naïve dialecticism on indecision. That 
is, having a dialectical worldview increases the degree of evaluative conflict toward the 
alternative that is eventually chosen, which in turn leads to a higher level of indecision.  
                                                 
25 All studies were conducted before the publication of Li et al (2014). 
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Chapter 6 
General Discussion 
Experiencing difficulty when making a decision or having regret about a choice 
made is a fairly common human experience. Despite its common occurrence and its 
potential negative impact on people’s lives, however, basic research on the nature of 
indecisiveness is still fairly limited (Rassin, 2007). Moreover, research examining how 
cultural factors influence individuals’ judgment and decision making processes and 
outcomes is still in its infancy, albeit growing healthily (see Savani, Cho, Baik, & 
Morris, in press, for an overview of recent advancements in this subfield). The current 
research aims at increasing our understanding of the phenomenon of indecisiveness by 
documenting and providing explanations for cultural variations in indecisive tendency 
and simultaneously shedding light on the basic processes underlying indecision.  
Summary of Findings 
Consistent with my expectations, it was found that Canadian participants of East 
Asian cultural backgrounds experienced more general indecisiveness than did Canadians 
of European and South Asian cultural backgrounds (Study 2). This replicates the past 
work of Wengrovitz and Patalano (2004, as cited in Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2006), 
which found that when the broader societal context is kept as a constant, people of East 
Asian cultural backgrounds tend to experience more decision difficulty than do people 
of European cultural backgrounds, and extends their study by including South Asian 
Canadians as a second control group. Extending their study, my research also shows 
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why this might be the case, with the East Asian cultural tradition of dialectical thinking 
giving rise to general indecisiveness (see also Li et al., 2014 for similar findings). 
In addition, I found that East Asian Canadians (vs. European Canadians and 
South Asian Canadians) were lower in need for cognition and this also statistically 
explained the cultural differences in chronic indecisiveness observed. Some scholars 
have noted that East Asian cultures have a history of focusing on practicality in their 
ways of thinking and in scientific investigations, in contrast to a quest for knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake or pure theoretical advancement (Nakamura, 1964). Although 
admittedly purely speculative, one possibility is that the lower levels of need for 
cognition in contemporary East Asians might reflect this tradition of practicality. Need 
for cognition as it is currently measured entails a pleasure component to thinking, in that 
those scoring high pursue complex or abstract thought because they find it enjoyable. 
For East Asians, thinking for its own sake or for pleasure’s sake may be seen as 
unappealing and unenjoyable. Accordingly, East Asians are less likely to endorse Need 
for Cognition items such as “the notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me” but 
more likely to endorse reversed items such as “I only think as hard as I have to”. 
Another possibility is related to the cultural dimension of individualism vs. 
collectivism. People from individualistic cultures, such as those from Western Europe 
and North America, are more likely to hold an independent self-view, emphasizing 
individual autonomy and uniqueness, whereas people from collectivistic cultures, such 
as those from Asia and Africa, are more likely to hold an interdependent self-view, 
emphasizing group harmony and social hierarchy (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 
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1995). Accordingly, social norms in individualistic (vs. collectivistic) cultures should 
encourage individual thoughts and unique ideas to a higher degree. As such, people who 
engage in individualistic cultural contexts might have developed a higher need or desire 
for cognitive activities, relative to people who engage in collectivistic cultural contexts.    
Going beyond previous research in the area of culture and indecisiveness, which 
typically uses either hypothetical decision scenarios (e.g., Tse, Lee, Vertinsky, & 
Wehrung, 1988) or measures general indecisiveness as an individual difference variable 
(e.g., Swami, Sinniah, Subramaniam, Pillai, Kannan, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2008), the 
current research examined an actual meaningful decision while statistically controlling 
for the number of alternatives. I found converging evidence that East Asian Canadian 
students exhibited a higher level of indecision on a number of measures, including 
decision difficulty, post-decision regret, and decision latency, compared with European 
Canadian students (Study 1). This underscores the importance of keeping constant or 
controlling for culture-contingent external factors while examining how culture-
contingent internal factors might influence general indecisiveness. Indeed, I suggest that 
the reason why some previous studies (e.g., Yates et al., 2010) did not find differences 
between Chinese and European Americans in general indecisiveness might be due to the 
confluence of culture-contingent internal and external factors.  
In addition, extending a recent demonstration of the causal link between naïve 
dialecticism and indecision (Li et al., 2014), I showed in the present research the process 
through which this lay theory of the world translates into a tendency to indecisiveness 
(Study 4). Consistent with research on how attitudinal ambivalence might induce 
  
74 
 
psychological distress when one needs to make an attitude-relevant decision, I found that 
attitudinal ambivalence toward one’s final choice before the decision is made leads to 
indecision, providing a proximal explanation to the causal effect of naïve dialecticism on 
indecision. This finding also contributes to the attitudinal ambivalence literature by 
showing how ambivalence might also lead to different manifestations of indecision, 
including decision difficulty, decision confidence, and worry about making the wrong 
decision.  
Furthermore, extending previous research on cultural differences in 
indecisiveness, which typically treat indecisiveness as the final outcome variable, I 
examined one downstream consequence of this cultural difference and found that higher 
chronic indecisiveness among individuals of East Asian (vs. European) cultural 
backgrounds gives rise to lower life satisfaction (Study 3). While replicating previous 
research that East Asians tend to be less satisfied with their lives compared with 
Westerners (e.g., Lee & Wu, 2008; Schkade & Kahneman, 1998), the present results 
contribute to the culture and life satisfaction literature by suggesting a novel pathway 
through which East Asian culture can lead to reduced life satisfaction; that is, through 
the burden of indecisiveness.  
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, the present research is the first to conduct 
measurement invariance tests before examining cultural differences in chronic 
indecisiveness. Differential Item Functioning results suggest that the Need for Cognition 
Scale, the Dialectical Self Scale, and the Indecisiveness Scale are appropriate to use 
when comparing people of East Asian, South Asian, and European cultural backgrounds, 
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and the Satisfaction with Life Scale is suitable to use when comparing individuals of 
East Asian and European cultural backgrounds (see Oishi, 2006, for measurement 
invariance tests comparing the English version and the Chinese version of the scale). It 
is important to point out, however, that this conclusion pertains only to the English 
version of the scales. Thus, when using the translated versions of these instruments, it is 
still advisable to ensure measurement invariance before comparing mean scores between 
cultural groups. 
Theoretical Implications 
Although the focus of this dissertation is cultural influences, the present findings 
also help elucidating why some individuals are more indecisive than others, regardless 
of cultural background. The construct of naïve dialecticism was initially developed in 
the context of cultural research (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Nisbett, 2003). Nevertheless, this 
form of thinking also varies within cultures. Indeed, the tendency toward dialectical 
thinking, when measured as an individual difference variable, has substantial variability 
within Chinese, Korean, Asian American, European American, and European Canadian 
samples (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007; Hamamura, Heine, & Paulhus, 2008; Spencer-
Rodgers et al., 2004). This is also true of the cultures examined in the current studies. 
Moreover, individual differences in dialectical thinking have been found to have the 
same predictive relationships within cultures as those found between cultures, with 
respect to self-esteem and life satisfaction for example (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004). In 
the present research, I also found similar within-culture correlations obtained between 
dialectical thinking and chronic indecisiveness (Studies 2 and 3), and between chronic 
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indecisiveness and life satisfaction (Study 3) across cultural groups. Furthermore, the 
causal effect of dialectical thinking on evaluative ambivalence and the associated 
indecisive tendencies was observed among participants of European cultural 
backgrounds (Study 4).  
Taken as a whole, the antecedent, the mechanism, and the consequence of 
indecisiveness found in the current research seem to apply across cultures, despite 
overall mean differences between cultural groups. As such, a major contribution to the 
indecisiveness literature, in addition to documenting and explaining cultural variations, 
is the identification of a novel mechanism underlying indecision; that is, having an 
internally inconsistent attitude toward the object that is eventually chosen is associated 
with the experience of indecision. To some extent, this antecedent of indecision shares 
some similarities with the notion and empirical findings that increased similarities in 
attractiveness among choice options increases indecision, or more specifically, the 
tendency to defer choice (Dhar, 1997). The mechanism documented in the present 
research, however, involves similarities between positive and negative evaluations 
within a single object, rather than similarities between objects. To empirically separate 
the two mechanisms, I also tested the possibility that dialectical thinking might have an 
effect on the closeness of overall evaluations of the choice alternatives, a reasonable 
index of similarities in attractiveness among the choice options. The present results, 
however, suggest that this is not the case; dialectical thinking has an influence 
exclusively on ambivalent evaluative tendency toward the chosen object, which leads to 
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indecision, but not overall attractiveness (i.e., overall evaluations) for the chosen object 
or the degree of similarities in attractiveness among the choice options. 
It is worth mentioning that although gender is not the main focus of the present 
research, consistent with most past studies the current results did not provide any 
evidence to suggest gender differences in chronic indecisiveness (e.g., Patalano & 
Wengrovitz, 2006, Swami et al., 2008; Yates et al., 2010). Nevertheless, there is one 
study conducted in the Netherlands that found that female participants scored higher on 
the Intensiveness Scale relative to male participants (Rassin & Muris, 2005). Taking 
these findings together, gender differences in indecisiveness observed in Rassin and 
Muris (2005) might be unique to their sample or the Dutch cultural context. 
At a broader level, the current finding that individuals of East Asian cultural 
backgrounds seem to find decision making more demanding and stressful because of a 
more dialectical worldview (and presumably a more ambivalent evaluative tendency) 
appears at odds with the existing evidence that they are less distressed by evaluative 
ambivalence, as indicated by their higher tendency to hold, and less inclination to 
resolve, ambivalent attitudes, compared with individuals of European cultural 
backgrounds (Ng et al., 2010, 2012). I believe that these seemingly discrepant results 
reflect the distinction between judgment and decision (Hogarth, 1981). For example, van 
Harreveld and colleagues (2009) distinguished between ambivalence and decision 
making, and viewed ambivalence as a pre-decisional phenomenon that is conceptually 
distinct from the decision itself. Accordingly, the degree of comfort (or discomfort) 
associated with simply holding an ambivalent attitude needs not be related to the degree 
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of distress experienced when making a decision about an object toward which one is 
holding an ambivalent attitude. I, therefore, interpret the current results as providing 
support to the dissociation between evaluative judgment and decision making. 
It is important to note that although the present results seem to suggest that East 
Asians, or dialectical thinkers, might be less likely to be overconfident in their 
judgments due to their heightened tendency to recognize and tolerate inconsistent 
information, compared with Westerners, or non-dialectical thinkers, the literature on 
overconfidence paints a different picture. It has been demonstrated that most East Asian 
groups are more overconfident in judging the probability that something is true (e.g., “I 
am 70% sure that the Suez Canal is longer than the Panama Canal”) than their Western 
counterparts (see Yates, 2010 for a review). As such, dialectical thinking seems to have 
an influence on attitudes (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004; Ng & Hynie, 2014) and 
behavioral indecision (e.g., having difficulty deciding what to eat for dinner; Li et al., 
2014) but not judgments of the probability of a statement being true.  
The present investigation also highlights the importance of not grouping East 
Asian and South Asian cultures together in psychological research even though they 
share certain general cultural characteristics (e.g., power distance, Hofstede, 2001). 
Instead, more research should be devoted to meaningfully differentiating different Asian 
cultures when examining the relationship between culture and psychology (see also 
Lalonde, Cilia, Lou, & Giguère, 2013). 
Practical Implications 
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If individuals of East Asian cultural backgrounds (or dialectical thinkers) have a 
relatively high tendency to experience decision difficulty and post-decision regret, and 
worry about making the wrong choice, they may refrain from making decisions if 
possible. Indeed, Study 4 data did suggest this possibility, even though the effect was not 
statistically significant with the current sample. In marketing contexts, it means that East 
Asian (vs. Western) consumers may be more likely to defer their choice, walking away 
from the store, or “decide not to decide” (i.e., making the decision to not make a 
purchase because making a purchase commitment is too demanding). This certainly is 
not good news to marketers. One potential remedy though, especially to the anticipated 
regret aspect of indecision, is to offer some sort of reassurance to the customers that 
their choice can be changed after the purchase. Hence, having and making salient a 
money-back guarantee or free exchange services may be especially important in East 
Asian markets. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Age differences. The generalizability of the present research is compromised by 
its use of student samples of a very limited variability in age. Attempts to replicate the 
present studies should be made using non-student samples of a larger age range. 
Relatedly, it would be informative to investigate how age and culture might jointly 
influence indecisiveness. There is some evidence that, in Western cultures, as people 
grow older, they tend to be less indecisive, probably because of the increased practice of 
making choices and decisions and/or an enhanced certainty about one’s preferences 
(Rassin, Muris, Franken, Smit, & Wong, 2005). From a cultural perspective, however, 
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prolonged immersion in a specific cultural meaning system may magnify the expression 
of cultural values or worldviews on cognition (Park, Nisbett, & Hedden, 1999). As such, 
indecisive tendency induced by naïve dialecticism may increase with age in East Asian 
cultures. In any case, the effect of age on indecisiveness in East Asian cultural contexts 
seems worthy of a systematic investigation.  
The effect of Common Method Variance. The correlational findings obtained 
in Studies 2 and 3 may suffer from the concern of common method variance (CMV; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). That is, researchers may obtain 
inflated correlational results when the two constructs are measured using the same 
measurement method, such as self-report questionnaire using a Likert-type scale. Thus, 
one may argue that our focal finding that naïve dialecticism predicts indecisiveness may 
be a result of CMV. Nevertheless, it is important to underscore that the positive 
association between these two focal variables was obtained when another variable (i.e., 
need for cognition), which share the same measurement method, was controlled for 
(Study 2). Hence, most of the effect of CMV should have also been partialled out as 
well. In addition, the experimental effect demonstrated in Study 4 should also strengthen 
the main conclusion that dialectical thinking causes indecision.   
The link between indecisiveness and life satisfaction. The present results 
provide support for the relationship between indecisiveness and reduced life satisfaction. 
Yet, how exactly indecisiveness can exert a negative impact on overall life satisfaction 
deserves further investigation. As described in the Introduction, one potential 
mechanism underlying this link is that the regrets of major life decisions make an 
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individual less satisfied with his or her life. This, nevertheless, may only be part of the 
story. The very act of choosing can be cognitively depleting, even when the choice itself 
is relatively inconsequential, resulting in impaired self-regulation (e.g., spending less 
time to study) (Vohs, Baumeister, Schmeichel, Twenge, Nelson, & Tice, 2008). This 
detrimental effect of choosing should be exacerbated for people who are chronically 
indecisive. Accordingly, having difficulty making decisions on a constant basis, even for 
very small ones, may lead to reduced psychological well-being over time.  
Potential versus felt ambivalence. Although I have shown that indecision 
induced by dialectical thinking can be explained by attitudinal ambivalence toward the 
chosen alternative, the current experiment (Study 4) tapped into only one of the two 
types of ambivalence. The literature distinguishes between potential and felt 
ambivalence, with the former conceptualized as the existence of conflicting evaluations 
(or coexistence of positive and negative attitude components) of an object and the latter 
conceptualized as the ambivalent feeling that is subjectively experienced (Jamieson, 
1993; Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002). Although these two types of 
ambivalence tend to be moderately correlated (Thompson et al., 1995), they are 
considered distinct constructs. The measure that we used was a measure of potential 
ambivalence. It would be theoretically interesting to compare the relative contribution of 
the two types of ambivalence to different manifestations of indecision, so as to gain a 
more nuanced understanding of this link.  
The effect of other cultural factors. Future research should investigate whether 
other culture factors would also contribute to indecisiveness. For example, seemingly 
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personal decisions, such as choosing a career or deciding whether or not to marry, may 
actually be a group decision for people with a collectivistic (vs. individualistic) cultural 
orientation. For this reason, decision making may be perceived as more difficult for 
collectivists (vs. individualists) because they feel that they need to consider the opinions 
of others to a greater extent. Although I did not find any difference in indecisiveness 
between participants of collectivistic (i.e., South Asian; Hofstede, 2001) cultural 
backgrounds and participants of individualistic (i.e., European; Hofstede, 2001) cultural 
backgrounds in the Study 2, it is still worthwhile to test this hypothesis in some specific 
decision domains that may be more amenable to this kind of social normative influences. 
Social desirability of decisiveness/indecisiveness. Finally, although the word 
“indecisive” tends to have negative connotations in Western cultural settings and the 
literature seems to paint a fairly negative picture of indecisiveness, it remains an open 
question whether the same indecisive behaviors are viewed equally negatively across 
cultures. It may be the case that, in some non-Western cultures, relatively long decision 
latency is viewed not as negatively as that viewed in Western cultures. In fact, it is 
possible that a seemingly decisive person may actually be viewed as an immature person 
who always make hasty, impulsive decisions in some cultures. It will be very interesting 
to examine the social desirability of decisiveness/indecisiveness in large scale cross-
cultural research.  
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Appendix A: Dialectical Self Scale (Spencer-Rodgers, Srivastava, & Peng, 2001) 
Listed below are a number of statements about your thoughts, feelings, and behaviours. 
Select the number that best matches your agreement or disagreement with each 
statement. Use the following scale, which ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
Strongly disagree           Neither agree     Strongly 
agree 
 nor disagree 
 
1. I am the same around my family as I am around my friends.  _____ 
2. When I hear two sides of an argument, I often agree with both.  _____ 
3. I believe my habits are hard to change.     _____ 
4. I believe my personality will stay the same all of my life.   _____ 
5. I often change the way I am, depending on who I am with.   _____ 
6. I often find that things will contradict each other.    _____ 
7. If I’ve made up my mind about something, I stick to it.   _____ 
8. I have a definite set of beliefs, which guide my behaviour at all times. _____ 
9. I have a strong sense of who I am and don’t change my views when  
others disagree with me.       _____ 
10. The way I behave usually has more to do with immediate circumstances  
 than with my personal preferences.      _____ 
11. My outward behaviours reflect my true thoughts and feelings.  _____ 
12. I sometimes believe two things that contradict each other.   _____ 
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13. I often find that my beliefs and attitudes will change under different  
contexts.         _____ 
14. I find that my values and beliefs will change depending on who I am with. 
          _____ 
15. My world is full of contradictions that cannot be resolved.   _____ 
16. I am constantly changing and am different from one time to the next. _____ 
17. I usually behave according to my principles.     _____ 
18. I prefer to compromise than to hold on to a set of beliefs.   _____ 
19. I can never know for certain that any one thing is true.   _____ 
20. If there are two opposing sides to an argument, they cannot both be right. 
          _____ 
21. My core beliefs don’t change much over time.    _____ 
22. Believing two things that contradict each other is illogical.   _____ 
23. I sometimes find that I am a different person by the evening than I was in  
the morning.         _____ 
24. I find that if I look hard enough, I can figure out which side of a  
controversial issue is right.       _____ 
25. For most important issues, there is one right answer.    _____ 
26. I find that my world is relatively stable and consistent.   _____ 
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27. When two sides disagree, the truth is always somewhere in the middle. _____ 
28. When I am solving a problem, I focus on finding the truth.   _____ 
29. If I think I am right, I am willing to fight to the end.    _____ 
30. I have a hard time making up my mind about controversial issues.  _____ 
31. When two of my friends disagree, I usually have a hard time deciding  
which of them is right.       _____ 
32. There are always two sides to everything, depending on how you look at it. 
          _____ 
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Appendix B: Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) 
 
For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is 
characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like 
you) please write a “1” to the left of the question; if the statement is extremely 
characteristic of you (very much like you) please write a “5” next to the question. Of 
course, a statement may be neither extremely uncharacteristic nor extremely 
characteristic of you; if so, please use the number in the middle of the scale that 
describes the best fit. Please keep the following scale in mind as you rate each of the 
statements below:  
 
 1--------------------2--------------------3--------------------4--------------------5 
extremely   somewhat     uncertain   somewhat   extremely 
uncharacteristic  uncharacteristic   characteristic   
characteristic 
 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.     _____ 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of  
    thinking.          _____ 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.       _____ 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that  
    is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.      _____ 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will  
    have to think in depth about something.       _____ 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.   _____ 
7. I only think as hard as I have to.        _____ 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.    _____ 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.    _____ 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. _____ 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. _____ 
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12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.    _____ 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.   _____ 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.    _____ 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one  
      that is somewhat important but does not require much thought.   _____ 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required  
      a lot of mental effort.        _____ 
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or  
      why it works.          _____ 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me  
      personally.         _____ 
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Appendix C: Indecisiveness Scale (Frost & Shows, 1993) 
 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements using a 7-
point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). 
  
1. I have trouble completing assignments because I cannot prioritize what is most  
    important.           _____ 
2. I have a hard time planning my free time.      _____ 
3. I try to put off making decisions.       _____ 
4. I become anxious when making a decision.     _____ 
5. After I have chosen or decided something, I often believe I’ve made the wrong  
    choice or decision.         _____ 
6. I find it easy to make decisions.        _____ 
7. I often worry about making the wrong choice.     _____ 
8. Once I make a decision, I feel fairly confident that it is a good one.   _____ 
9. I always know exactly what I want.       _____ 
10. When ordering from a menu, I usually find it difficult to decide what to get.  _____ 
11. I do not get assignments done on time because I cannot decide what to do  
      first.          _____  
12. I like to be in a position to make decisions.     _____ 
13. Once I make a decision, I stop worrying about it.     _____ 
14. It seems that deciding on the most trivial things takes me a long time.  _____ 
15. I usually make decisions quickly.       _____ 
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Appendix D: Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 
1985) 
 
Below are five statements with which you may agree or disagree. Using the 1-7 scale 
below, indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the 
line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding. The 7-point 
scale is as follows: 
  
1 = strongly disagree  
2 = disagree  
3 = slightly disagree  
4 = neither agree nor disagree  
5 = slightly agree  
6 = agree  
7 = strongly agree  
 
1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal.       _____ 
2. The conditions of my life are excellent.       _____ 
3. I am satisfied with my life.        _____ 
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.     _____ 
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.   _____ 
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Appendix E: Dialectical Prime Used in Study 4 (Adapted from Spencer-Rodgers et 
al., 2004) 
Life can be full of contradiction and uncertainty. We would like you to reflect, in 
writing, on a time in your life when it was full of contradiction and uncertainty. We 
would like you to recall experiences in which you were very aware of both the pros and 
cons of the situations and there were no right answers. The situations or experiences had 
positive outcomes and consequences for you and/or the people you care about as well as 
equally negative outcomes or consequences for you and/or the people you care about. 
Think about these contradictory experiences . . . describe how you thought through all of 
the facts and possible perspectives, including the opposing ones. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
